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Unintended Agency Problems: How 
International Bureaucracies Are Built and 
Empowered 
 
ANU BRADFORD,* STAVROS GADINIS,** AND KATERINA LINOS*** 
 
The ground underneath the entire liberal international order is rapidly shifting. 
Institutions as diverse as the European Union, International Monetary Fund, United 
Nations, and World Trade Organization are under major threat. These institutions 
reflect decades of political investments in a world order where institutionalized 
cooperation was considered an essential cornerstone for peace and prosperity. Going 
beyond the politics of the day, this Article argues that the seeds of today’s discontent 
with the international order were in fact sown back when these institutions were first 
created. We show how states initially design international institutions with features 
that later haunt them in unexpected ways. In the worst cases, states become so 
dissatisfied with the institutions they build that they threaten to abandon or dissolve 
them, shaking the foundations of the international order. Our central argument is that 
two cooperation problems intersect in unanticipated ways. The first problem —the 
horizontal conflict—involves the distribution of benefits among states. When states 
first create an international organization, they seek to capture a big share of the benefits 
and protect their interests vis-à-vis other states. They do this by demanding voting rules 
that allow them to block unfavorable decisions, requiring leadership positions for their 
own nationals, and lobbying to include their priority issues on the organization’s 
agenda. We argue that this initial effort to resolve distributional conflicts is short-
sighted, ultimately leaving states dissatisfied with the international organizations they 
build. The second problem—the vertical conflict among states collectively, on the one 
hand, and international organization bureaucracies and tribunals, on the other—is 
worsened by the compromises reached to resolve the horizontal conflict. For example, 
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when states agree that key decisions must be reached by consensus, it becomes difficult 
to roll back the actions of a wayward secretariat or tribunal down the line. Or, when 
states place their own nationals in key positions, a multi-national body with an 
international agenda emerges. Such an international organization can become detached 
from the national concerns of its creators. Moreover, when states put their key issues 
on the organization’s agenda, a broad mandate results. In turn, a broad mandate 
empowers the organization’s staff to set its own priorities, making state control difficult. 
Contrary to prior isolated studies on horizontal and vertical conflicts, we are the first 
to identify how the two conflicts intersect in important and unexpected ways. To find 
possible solutions, we draw on analogous intersections in corporate law literature, which 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Populist voices and election outcomes in the United States and Europe 
have made it clear that international cooperation is not in vogue. 
International institutions are increasingly associated with all things evil, be it 
the loss of jobs, the loss of a sense of personal and national security, or the 
dissolution of local culture and identity as we know it. Nationalist currents 
have supplanted the notion that common problems are beyond any 
individual nation’s capacity to resolve alone, calling into question the very 
existence of international institutions as the bedrock of the global order. 
Examples abound. Deep discontent with the European Union (EU) is 
threatening to tear it apart. Up north, the United Kingdom has begun the 
unprecedented process of negotiating its exit from the EU after a bitter 
referendum on its membership in the body.1 British Euro-sceptics have for 
decades derided regulations and directives issued by Brussels, and have 
abhorred treaty commitments toward “an ever-closer union.”2 Most 
recently, critics of European integration have directed their ire toward 
migrants from other EU-member states, claiming that their influx into the 
U.K. has placed immense strain on the country’s welfare programs.3 Yet 
even when facing mounting criticism directed at the free movement of 
people, EU institutions remain steadfast in defending the right of all EU 
citizens to live, work, and receive equal treatment throughout the Union. 
Along the EU’s southern border, Greece in particular has been unable to 
stem the tide of refugees fleeing upheaval in the Middle East. Once such 
refugees enter an EU-member state, they enjoy uninhibited access to other 
member states, due to the abolishment of border controls under the 
Schengen agreement.4 Consequently, the migration problem in the South 
quickly evolved into a problem for the entire EU. As anger among member 
states mounted, European Council leadership made an unprecedented move 
by threatening Greece with temporary suspension from the Schengen zone.5 
These examples suggest that while European states initially created the EU 
                                               
1 Tara Palmeri, The EU and David Cameron: We Need to Talk About Brexit, POLITICO (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-david-cameron-european-union-eu-migrant-reform/. 
2 Id. 
3 This is recognized as the most controversial part in Britain. See George Parker & Alex Barker, 
Cameron’s EU Deal: What the UK Has—and Has Not—Secured, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ed0b3516-c9a6-11e5-a8ef-
ea66e967dd44.html#axzz3zXD1smLN; see also Alberto Nardelli et al., Fortress Mentality on EU Migration 
Creates Xenophobia, Warns Italian PM, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jan/19/fortress-mentality-european-migration-creates-xenophobia-italian-pm-matteo-
renzi. 
4 Schengen Agreement, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
5 Jim Brunsden, Kerin Hope & Peter Spiegel, EU Threatens to Reimpose Greek Border Controls, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/674647a6-c4f9-11e5-808f-
8231cd71622e.html#axzz3zXD1smLN. 
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as their agent, their roles have reversed. Increasingly, the EU is acting as 
principal, insisting that member states implement its mounting regulations 
and rulings, whether in their national interest or not. 
At the core of both the horizontal and vertical conflicts lies the EU’s 
doctrines about free movement of people, which mandate that all EU 
nationals enjoy the privileges traditionally offered exclusively to each 
member state’s own citizens.6 The Schengen zone further facilitates free 
movement by removing border controls.7 Although now considered 
bedrocks of European integration, the free movement principle was not 
forged in the intense state-to-state negotiations that typically produce EU 
treaties. Rather, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) relied on scant and 
cryptic treaty language to give practical significance to these doctrines.8 The 
ECJ often acted at the behest of the European Commission, which brought 
complaints against member states not pursuing integration in earnest.9 It 
may seem surprising that member states vested EU institutions with powers 
that are now deployed against them. However, this was a natural response 
to the horizontal conflict at the time. The ECJ and Commission were 
entrusted with interpretation and implementation powers because they were 
established as neutral arbiters, who would not do one member state’s 
bidding against others. This neutral status required the ECJ and 
Commission to operate outside of any single state’s control. Yet, over the 
years, EU institutions converted this independence into a powerful 
instrument to pursue their own agenda, even when it ran contrary to the will 
of governments that established them in the first place. 
The EU is hardly the only international organization (IO) threatened by 
schism. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), another pillar of the post-
WWII order, now shares the global scene with the New Development Bank, 
founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).10 As 
these countries’ importance in the world economy grew significantly in the 
past fifteen years, they sought to increase their voice in global fora. These 
countries thought past attempts to reform the IMF governance structure 
had not gone far enough, and were dissatisfied by the Europeans’ decades-
old power-sharing agreement with the U.S., which saw Europeans continue 
                                               
6 Ottavio Marzocchi, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Free Movement of Persons, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT (June 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html. 
7 Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German Asylum 
Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 503 (1993). 
8 Karen Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of 
Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121 (1998); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). 
9 RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, 
MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 137 tbl.4.5, 139 tbl.4.6 (2007). 
10 Raj M. Desai & James R. Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS Is All About, WASH. POST (July 
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-
bank-of-brics-is-all-about/. 
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to select the IMF head.11 Thus, when the IMF participated in the Greek 
bailout under terms generally perceived as more favorable than those 
extended to non-Europeans, BRICS voiced their opposition in no uncertain 
terms.12 Shortly thereafter, in a move steeped in symbolism, they announced 
their own international development bank initiative. 
Nevertheless, it is not only emerging economic powers that question the 
merits of existing institutions. The United States—the architect of much of 
the post-WWII institutional order—is also threatening to walk away from 
the order it created and actively supported throughout the post-WWII era. 
The new Trump administration is currently renegotiating the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It has also threatened to 
withdraw from, or renegotiate, many other international treaties that, 
allegedly, do not serve its interests, possibly including the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Recent executive orders also aim to undermine 
institutions such as the United Nations by withholding funding from its 
operations.13 If the United States goes through with its threat to cut at least 
40% of its contributions to international agencies, it will severely hamper 
the ability of those agencies to function. For example, the U.S. currently 
funds a quarter of UN peacekeeping operations, which, absent U.S. support, 
may not be able to continue. 
In the examples above, and in others discussed below, conflicts between 
IOs and the states they represent grew so heated that withdrawal of support, 
exit, or the creation of a competing institution were deemed appropriate 
responses. Such radical outcomes are hard to explain based on existing 
accounts of IOs, even those typically critical of these institutions. For 
example, if one accepts that powerful member states dominate IOs, then it 
is difficult to understand how IOs develop the strength to turn against these 
states. On the other hand, if one sees IOs as international bureaucrats 
spinning out of control, it is hard to understand why states created them in 
the first place, and why they believe that creating new competing institutions 
is a plausible alternative. 
We argue that these crises are connected at their roots and arise out of 
the intersection of two challenges that have thus far been studied separately. 
                                               
11 Why Have Europeans Dominated the IMF?, NPR (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/09/137075631/should-a-european-head-the-imf. 
12 Leonid Bershidsky, IMF Reform Is Too Little, Too Late, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-18/imf-reform-is-too-little-way-too-late. 
13 Max Fisher, Trump Prepares Orders Aiming at Global Funding and Treaties, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/united-nations-trump-
administration.html?_r=0; Geoff Dyer, Donald Trump Threatens to Pull US Out of WTO, FIN. TIMES 
(Jul. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d97b97ba-51d8-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef; James 
Bacchus, Trump’s Challenge to the WTO, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-challenge-to-the-wto-1483551994; Ayesha Rascoe, Trump to 
Begin Renegotiating NAFTA Pact Soon with Mexico, Canada, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nafta-idUSKBN156128. 
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The first challenge concerns conflicts among member states (horizontal 
conflicts), while the second challenge focuses on conflicts between member 
states as a group and the IOs (vertical conflicts). We argue that when IOs 
are first established, the possibility of horizontal conflict among states looms 
large in negotiators’ minds. States therefore design IOs with features that 
protect them from the overreach and shirking of other states. However, as 
these IOs mature—and separate secretariats, courts, and other governance 
bodies gain power—a deep vertical conflict between the states collectively, 
and the IOs, begins to emerge. We claim that design features initially 
designed to protect states from each other ultimately limit states’ collective 
ability to control wayward bureaucracies and courts. In other words, the 
measures designed to resolve the horizontal conflict inadvertently lay a 
foundation for a vertical conflict, leading states from one problem to 
another. Throughout this Article, we will refer to this interaction between 
the horizontal and vertical conflicts as the “joint problem.” 
When today’s major IOs were designed shortly after World War II, each 
government sought to capture its fair share of the gains from cooperation, 
and worried that foreign governments might make decisions that only 
benefited them. We call this distributional conflict among states a horizontal 
conflict. For instance, in setting up the EU’s predecessor—the European 
Coal and Steel Community—France, Germany, and every other state 
wanted to guarantee receipt of its fair share of the common goods produced 
by the organization. Of course, this horizontal conflict is not peculiar to the 
EU; it characterizes every IO. It stems from the fact that modern states 
understand themselves first and foremost as nation-states, and only 
secondarily as members of a global community. 
One way in which states preserved their power vis-à-vis other states in 
their initial bargains was by insisting on super-majority or, even more 
commonly, unanimity for every important decision. Another way in which 
states sought to prevail vis-à-vis other states was by demanding spots within 
IOs’ bureaucracies for their nationals. Still another technique states 
employed was geographic; they located IOs far from their rivals’ capitals, in 
small and neutral countries. Finally, states created IOs with relatively broad 
mandates, in an effort to link diverse issues that were important to different 
states. 
As time passed, IOs grew in complexity. They acquired more powers as 
states delegated major tasks to bodies that were increasingly independent 
from state control, such as the European Commission and European 
Courts, the UN Secretariat, and the WTO dispute settlement body. This 
delegation of power, while mitigating the horizontal conflict, planted the 
seeds for an emerging vertical conflict between states as principals and IOs 
as their agents. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333187 
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We will show that measures devised to improve each state’s bargaining 
position vis-à-vis foreign states often unintentionally weaken states’ 
collective control over the very institutions they designed. For example, the 
rule that every state must consent to every major decision means that once 
power is delegated, it is almost impossible to obtain the votes necessary to 
rein in wayward bureaucracies and tribunals. Similarly, the rule that every 
state can place its nationals in key IO positions means that IO secretariats 
and courts are composed of people from many countries, who in turn 
develop supra-national affinities, and are more eager to move key powers 
away from national capitals and toward the IO. Relatedly, IOs are often set 
up in relatively remote locations—such as Brussels, Luxembourg, Geneva, 
and The Hague—far from the national capitals of most powerful states. 
When this happens, civil servants and judges end up socializing primarily 
with other internationally minded persons, and lose touch with the day-to-
day concerns in national capitals. Finally, due to broad IO mandates, IO 
staff members have greater room to prioritize issues they consider 
important, sometimes at the expense of member states’ interests. 
Accordingly, such a broad mandate makes it harder to monitor the IO’s 
performance, compromising states’ abilities to detect and sanction its 
wayward activities. 
The central claim we will advance below is one of unintended 
consequences where states, while mitigating one obstacle for cooperation, 
simply replace it with another. In other words, when addressing the 
horizontal conflict, states lay the seeds for a vertical conflict. The existing 
literature on IOs has examined these conflicts in isolation, failing to address 
the interdependence between the two. In developing our claim, we will build 
on a prominent tradition in rationalist literature that explores the benefits 
and costs of centralization and delegation to a neutral actor.14 We will also 
draw on important constructivist work that explains how international 
organizations, like all bureaucracies, create standardization and end up 
applying path-dependent models to distinct problems.15 Both the vertical 
and horizontal conflicts are well explored in various literatures; our 
innovation is in studying how they intersect.16 
                                               
14 See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 9–29 (1998). 
15 See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 707–27 (1999). 
16 The most closely related literature trends mention, but then bracket, the issue of multiple 
principals. See, e.g., DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. 
Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006); Beth A. Simmons, Frank 
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberality, 60 INT’L ORG. 781 
(2006); Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006); Duane Swank, Tax Policy in an Era of 
Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 847 (2006); Chang Kil Lee & 
David Strang, The International Diffusion of Public-Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Drive 
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In elucidating the interrelated nature of vertical and horizontal conflicts, 
we will turn to corporate law—a field where the joint problem has been 
widely studied, but on which the literature on IOs has not drawn extensively. 
Corporate law often delegates major decision-making power to boards, not 
only to enhance the smoothness of day-to-day operations, but also to 
protect small, passive shareholders from large, active ones. However, 
delegating broad powers to a board can entrench the board and allow it to 
make decisions independent of shareholder concerns. To ameliorate this 
joint problem, corporate law specifies a series of governance rules, including 
disclosure obligations, proposal-making rules, and voting rules. We will 
draw some lessons from corporate law about how specifically to structure 
and implement transparency and minority protection. 
An enhanced understanding of the interdependence between horizontal 
and vertical conflicts enables us to grapple with the specific contexts and 
conditions in which the joint problem is likely the most salient. For example, 
we expect the horizontal conflict to be most acute for young international 
bodies, and the vertical conflict to become sharper as organizations grow 
and, critically, delegate more powers to supra-national organs.17 
Additionally, we expect small and large states to perceive the relative threat 
of the horizontal and vertical conflict to their sovereignty in different ways. 
While large and economically powerful countries are likely to see centralized 
institutions as constraints on their power, small countries may benefit from 
delegation to institutions that gradually come to advance the collective 
preferences of the member states. We will therefore explore the scope for, 
and the particular manifestations of, our argument before concluding. 
We will conclude by conceding that the joint problem is here to stay; 
reversing the features that initially created the joint problem is rarely a viable 
option for states. We are unlikely to see a radical reform of voting rules, the 
repatriation of internationally minded and networked staff, the relocation of 
IO headquarters, or the delinking of issues to create single-issue IOs. We 
will explore how some options to escape the joint problem—exiting from 
the IO, creating smaller, more homogeneous regional organizations, and 
creating looser networks of states—each come with benefits, but also major 
costs. We will not identify a solution to reshape the international 
institutional landscape. Rather, our goal is to lead states to better recognize 
important trade-offs as they delegate powers to IOs, enabling them to act 
                                               
Learning, 60 INT’L ORG. 883 (2006); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization, 60 INT’L ORG. 911 (2006); Michael J. Gillian, Is Enforcement 
Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935 (2006); Jon 
Pevehouse & Bruce Russett, Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace, 60 INT’L 
ORG. 969 (2006); Irfan Nooruddin & Joel W. Simmons, The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and 
Government Spending, 60 INT’L ORG. 1001 (2006). 
17 See infra Part IV.B. (acknowledging how decision-making bodies based on state representation 
– such as the World Health Assembly or the Security Council – never fully resolve horizontal conflict). 
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with an enhanced awareness of future consequences. We will draw on 
corporate law for specific governance techniques that could ameliorate—
without fully resolving—some of the challenges stemming from the joint 
problem. 
The motivation behind our project is primarily descriptive, not 
normative. Sovereign states delegating power to an IO may find the joint 
problem disconcerting—but others may welcome its positive outcomes. For 
example, human rights courts might eagerly challenge states’ practices, even 
in matters of national security or other sensitive state interests. Similarly, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) might advise against travel to states 
with emergent epidemics without first consulting with those states, and thus 
without first taking these states’ sovereignty concerns as seriously as they 
would like.18 Relatedly, the ECJ moved very quickly toward trade 
liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, even though member states would 
have retained protectionist barriers for longer, as evidenced by the slow pace 
with which they passed directives and regulations to liberalize markets.19 
Rapid progress toward human rights, infectious disease eradication, and 
trade liberalization are all arguably desirable from several perspectives, but 
can be problematic from the perspective of states with more cautious 
preferences. 
The Article will proceed as follows. Section I will describe the origins 
and types of horizontal and vertical conflicts. Section II will develop the 
core theoretical argument by explaining how the two conflicts intersect. 
Section III will draw on corporate law literature to illustrate how the joint 
problem manifests itself in a different institutional context. Section IV will 
lay out the distributional consequences associated with the joint problem. 
The Conclusion will close with a brief discussion of the ways states can 
respond to the joint problem. 
II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS: EXAMPLES OF HORIZONTAL AND 
VERTICAL CONFLICTS 
A. Horizontal Conflict—Distributional Conflict Among States  
1. The Origins and Types of Horizontal Conflicts 
The primary motivations for pursuing international cooperation are 
states’ needs to address various collective action problems and to share the 
costs of providing public goods such as peace and security, free trade, and 
                                               
18See, e.g., Yanzhong Huang, The SARS Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective, in 
LEARNING FROM SARS—PREPARING FOR THE NEXT OUTBREAK: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 116 
(2004). 
19 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Wayne Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance, 
4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 297 (1997). 
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environmental sustainability. Pooling resources allows states to harness 
economies of scale, thereby expanding the availability and sharing the costs 
of these public goods. It also allows states to better constrain opportunistic 
behavior such as free riding. 
International cooperation typically makes all states collectively better 
off. Yet, various conflicts of interest make even the most beneficial 
cooperation challenging. States hold divergent views, for example, as to the 
precise sectors of the economy that ought to be liberalized, and the optimal 
balance between free trade and social protections.20 They also disagree on 
the salience of various security threats, and the appropriate ways to respond 
to them. States might agree on the importance of “fair” allocation of 
responsibilities for environmental protection, but cannot agree on what this 
means when it comes to allocating precise emissions quotas.21 When states 
pool their resources to create an IO, each state wants to enjoy at least its fair 
share of the goods the IO produces, and to avoid undertaking more 
obligations than other members. Relatedly, each state wants to contribute 
no more than its fair share of the operating costs of the IO. We call this 
distributional conflict over the costs and benefits of joining and governing 
an IO a horizontal conflict, or a conflict between “principals,” as it takes place 
between legally equal and functionally similar sovereign states. 
Sometimes horizontal conflicts manifest as a classic collective action 
problem, where individual interest clashes with group interest. Environmental 
cooperation efforts often embody this dynamic: each state has an incentive 
to defect from cooperation and free ride on others’ efforts to protect the 
global commons.22 Establishing genuine cooperation on global climate 
change, for instance, would require states to overcome this incentive to free 
ride on others’ efforts. Yet, collective action problems are not limited to the 
environmental realm. Free riding can even occur in the context of “club 
goods” (as opposed to “public goods”) where states should, in principle, be 
                                               
20 SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43387, 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS 11 (2014); 
FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2015); Jessica Glenza, TPP Deal: US and 11 Other 
Countries Reach Landmark Pacific Trade Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 8:47 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/trans-pacific-partnership-deal-reached-
pacific-countries-international-trade. 
21 Fiona Harvey, Everything You Need to Know About the Paris Climate Summit and UN Talks, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/02/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-
paris-climate-summit-and-un-talks; Rowena Mason, Copenhagen Summit: Developing Countries to Challenge 
Emissions Limits, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 30, 2009, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6694667/Copenhagen-
summit-developing-countries-to-challenge-emissions-limits.html; Edward Cameron, What is Equity in 
the Context of Climate Negotiations?, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.wri.org/blog/2012/12/what-equity-context-climate-negotiations. 
22 See generally Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global Environmental Protection, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 68 (1990). 
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able to limit the enjoyment of public goods to the IO members.23 In 
international trade, for example, free riding can take place within the WTO 
itself, although only WTO member states enjoy the benefits of lower trade 
barriers, making it impossible for non-members to free ride.24 This is 
because all WTO members benefit from a Most-Favored-Nation principle, 
which entails each WTO member enjoying the same degree of market 
access, irrespective of its willingness to open its markets in return.25 The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is conversely an example of 
an IO that can avoid free riding by limiting its security guarantees to its 
members. But many countries still benefit indirectly from its security 
umbrella, choosing to enjoy the military protections of NATO without 
contributing troops or funds in exchange for more direct and tangible 
security guarantees.26 
Even when free riding is not a central concern, various distributional 
conflicts undermine international cooperation. In these instances, each state 
may be better off cooperating than defecting, but may face difficult 
questions regarding division of the costs and benefits of cooperation. This 
is because each state wants to negotiate a bargain that maximizes its (net) 
gains from cooperation. In the IMF, for example, Executive Board 
members are often divided by who the Fund should lend to, as well as the 
amount of funds that should be dispatched. Such disagreements stem from 
states’ varying domestic financial policy considerations (such as the 
exposure of their respective private sectors to possible insolvency in some 
country) and geopolitical motivations.27 In the UN, distributional conflict 
typically focuses on divisions between developed and developing countries. 
These countries disagree on whether international obligations should be 
universal or differentiated based on the members’ development levels, and 
hence capacity to comply.28 Another tension stems from the two-tier 
                                               
23 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 635, 678 (2007). 
24 Glossary Term: Free-rider, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/free_rider_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017); 
Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?, 77 J. INT’L ECON. 137, 
137–38 (2009). 
25 Principles of the Trading System, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
26 President Trump has repeatedly criticized this alleged free-riding on U.S. security guarantees in 
the NATO. For this reason, he has gone as far as to threaten not to respect the security guarantees that 
are at the heart of the treaty alliance. See Carol Morello & Adam Taylor, Trump Says US Won’t Rush to 




27 See Mark S. Copelovitch, Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending, 
54 INT’L STUD. Q. 49, 58 (2010). 
28 For discussion of this tension in international law, see Christopher D. Stone, Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 281–83 (2004). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333187 
2018] UNINTENDED AGENCY PROBLEMS  171 
membership structure in the UN Security Council. Under this structure, 
permanent members can override other member nations because of their 
outsized influence over decisions involving international peace and security. 
That said, the horizontal conflicts between veto-holding members often 
paralyze the Security Council itself.29 
Distributional conflicts can be stark even in an IO like the EU, where 
membership is perceived as more homogenous, and where member states’ 
interests are likely to be more aligned as a result. The most pressing 
horizontal conflict dividing the EU today stems from the varying strength 
of pro-integration parties and Euro-sceptics in domestic political systems. 
This disparity causes countries to fundamentally disagree on the extent of 
delegation and, therefore, on the ultimate scope of competences possessed 
by the EU. Other issues lend themselves to the traditional Right-Left 
division, such as states’ disagreements about the optimal balance between 
economic and social goals of the EU. Yet, on other issues, conflicts and 
coalitions shift depending on the individual member state’s debtor or 
creditor status, trade balance, energy infrastructure, share of agricultural 
production, socioeconomic challenges, salience of organized labor, or 
strength of environmental interests. These varied political and ideological 
commitments beget a myriad of horizontal conflicts, and represent a 
significant and continuing impediment to collective action within the EU. 
Finally, horizontal conflicts are not limited to disagreements between 
states over the substantive content of institutionalized cooperation. They 
also occur over issues relating to institutional design and governance 
features of the IO. For example, states may disagree on how much they will 
contribute to the budget, where the IO will be located, which language(s) 
the IO will use, which nationals will occupy the most important leadership 
positions, and so on. States perceive these features as central in defining 
whose preferences the IO will serve, and the types of agendas it will 
ultimately advance. 
2. Conditions That Exacerbate Horizontal Conflicts 
In some instances, horizontal conflicts are particularly severe. We expect 
horizontal tensions to be most salient under three conditions: first, when 
states seek to resolve collective action problems; second, when cooperation takes 
place in the domain of high politics (as opposed to low politics);30 and finally, 
                                               
29 See, e.g., Julian Borger & Bastien Inzaurralde, Russian Vetoes Are Putting UN Security Council’s 
Legitimacy at Risk, Says US, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-
legitimacy-at-risk-says-us. 
30 High politics traditionally refers to cooperation in the national security area, which is considered 
particularly sovereignty-sensitive. Low politics refers to less contentious policy areas, such as economic 
cooperation. 
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where cooperation calls for a greater number of states to be involved. Genuine 
collective action problems, such as climate change, always present incentives 
for cheating and defection. This breeds distrust among states and deepens 
horizontal strains. Similarly, issues of high politics, such as national security, 
entail distinctly sovereignty-sensitive issues, making states particularly 
fearful of any potential breakdown in relations, and hence wary of one 
another. We also expect horizontal conflicts to be more prevalent as more 
states come to participate in the cooperative endeavor, as every collective 
decision must accommodate a greater number of heterogeneous 
preferences. 
The failure to create a strong IO to govern one of the most pressing 
collective action problems—climate change—speaks to the severity of the 
horizontal problem facing states. While the benefits from mitigating climate 
change would be enormous, the distributional tensions and incentives to 
free ride have caused a continuing stalemate and the emergence of only 
weak, non-institutionalized cooperation. Moreover, the number of states 
involved in global climate talks has only exacerbated the horizontal problem. 
As a result, any regional IO governing climate change, while arguably less 
useful, would be easier to establish. It is thus not surprising that the EU has 
managed to implement EU-level climate policies,31 but has not persuaded 
other states to join the EU at the global level. Whether the IO is designed 
to facilitate state cooperation in high versus low politics matters as well. 
Horizontal conflicts tend to be especially stark in matters of national 
security. Border disputes, for example, always invoke high tensions between 
the disputing states, and can escalate to military conflict in the worst cases.32 
Here, horizontal conflict can be penetrating even where only two neighbors 
are involved. Examples abound, including the Israel-Palestine conflict, one 
of the most intractable and long-lasting horizontal conflicts. 
3. Ways to Mitigate Horizontal Conflicts 
One way to alleviate horizontal conflict is to keep IO membership small, 
as smaller IOs can be better tailored to membership preferences. This 
strategic choice comes with a cost, however, as the collective benefits of 
cooperation are more limited when fewer countries contribute to the 
provision of a public good. For example, a free trade agreement between 
two countries will entail fewer horizontal conflicts and generate some 
economic benefits, but will be inherently less valuable than securing nearly 
universal trade within an entity like the WTO—however contested certain 
details are. 
                                               
31 See generally European Climate Change Programme, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2017). 
32 See, e.g., Clashes on Thai-Cambodian Border, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7980535.stm. 
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Another solution is the establishment of executive organs, where some 
member states are represented and others are not.33 For instance, the World 
Bank has the Board of Executive Directors, the WHO has the Executive 
Board, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has its 
Council, among others. These executive boards—which facilitate decision-
making—have a much smaller membership than the organization as a 
whole. They also sometimes have positions reserved for states with 
particularly strong interests in the IO’s area of activity. For instance, the 
“Principle of the Adequate Representation” in the ICAO Council rules calls 
for the election of states of “chief importance in air transport,” as well as 
the election of states that make the “largest contribution to the provision of 
facilities for international civil air navigation.”34 In so doing, these smaller 
executive boards begin to resemble corporate boards in ways outlined in 
Part III below.  
Recognizing this trade-off between the benefits of large membership 
and the rising heterogeneity costs of adding additional members, states often 
seek to group with like-minded countries. This explains the prevalence and 
relative success of regional IOs and institutions with highly restrictive and 
relatively homogeneous membership, such as the EU, the Andean Tribunal, 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).35 Another way to alleviate horizontal tensions is to place strong 
accession conditions on new members to homogenize membership at the 
outset.36 For example, the WTO requires new members to adopt significant 
trade liberalization measures before entering; the EU subjects each new 
member to extensive accession conditions to align the candidate country’s 
economic, legal, and political system closely with the EU; and the Council 
of Europe requires its members to commit to the protection of fundamental 
rights.37 
                                               
33 We are deeply grateful to Kristina Daugirdas for all of the ideas in this paragraph. 
34 See Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, at 18, Doc 7600/8 (2014),  
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7600_cons_en.pdf. 
35 See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors: 
Understanding Preliminary Reference Patters in the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871 
(2009). 
36 See generally Anu Bradford, How International Institutions Evolve, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2014). 
37 See, e.g., Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the “Acquis Communautaire,” 23 
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 249, 252–53 (2002) (examining the EU’s accession conditions and how their 
ambiguity increases the EU’s bargaining power in accession negotiations); Raj Bhala, Enter the 
Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (2000) (mapping 
the extensive history of negotiations regarding China’s accession to the WTO); Julia Ya Qin, 
“WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An 
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (analyzing the additional 
and stringent rules applied to China); Abdur Chowdhury, WTO Accession: What’s in it for Russia? 
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 595, 2003), 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39981/wp595.pdf (discussing the 
history and challenges of Russia’s WTO accession negotiations); See generally North Atlantic Treaty 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333187 
174 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 57:2 
These efforts to preempt looming horizontal conflicts ex ante often fail 
ex post, as the states—or the established IO —have only a limited ability to 
monitor members’ compliance with entry conditions after accession has 
occurred.38 Further, unlike most clubs that choose to limit membership to 
like-minded individuals, many IOs have aspirations of universal (or at least 
broad) membership, so as to increase gains from cooperation, reduce 
free riding, and ensure that their rules enjoy greater legitimacy and 
following. This makes horizontal conflicts inevitable. Distributional 
conflicts also persist because IOs rarely establish mechanisms to increase 
membership homogeneity over time. In small membership clubs, 
frequent interaction and socialization can lead to greater similarities in 
thinking over time. And in some large groups, notably federations and 
nation-states more generally, significant efforts are made to develop a 
common history, language, and sense of community and patriotism, all 
to foster a shared identity between citizens.39 In turn, this greater 
homogeneity alleviates distributional conflict by legitimizing transfers to 
fellow citizens. However, to date (with the possible exception of the EU) 
IOs have made only limited efforts to foster a sense of shared goals and 
community among their members, thereby keeping horizontal conflict a 
salient and persistent feature of international cooperation. In all, it is 
difficult to limit horizontal conflict without simultaneously reducing the 
gains of cooperation. 
                                               
art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (requiring potential NATO members accept 
the obligations of a reciprocal military alliance, which makes it obligatory for any NATO member 
state to militarily aid of any other NATO state under attack); North American Free Trade 
Agreement art. 102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (requiring member states to eliminate 
trade barriers, promote fair competition, increase investment opportunities, and protect 
intellectual property rights); Org. for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 
Council, Roadmap for the Accession of Chile to the OECD Convention, art. II(A)(ii)(12), 
C(2007)100/FINAL (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/legal/41463062.pdf (requiring that 
potential member states to not only share the same fundamental values that the OECD 
Convention embodies, but also implement policies that demonstrate these countries’ 
commitment). 
38 See, e.g., Report from the Commission of the European Communities—Greece—Report Prepared in 
Accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty, SEC (2009) 197 final (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/104-
03/2009-02-18_el_104-3_en.pdf; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Progress in Romania Under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, COM (2013) 47 final (Jan. 
30, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2013_47_en.pdf; U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON WTO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: RUSSIA (June 2013), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/06192013%20Russia%20WTO%20Enforcement%20
Report.pdf. 
39 Cris Shore, Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural 
Policy,' 28 MAN, NEW SERIES 779, 784–787 (1993). 
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B. Vertical Conflict—Conflict Between States and Independent IO Bodies  
1. The Origins and Types of Vertical Conflicts 
One way to mitigate horizontal conflict is by creating an international 
organization. As Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal argue, states create formal 
IOs because IO centralization and independence can help reduce conflicts 
among states.40 For example, the WTO is designed to facilitate trade 
agreements across issue areas so that horizontal conflicts give way to trade 
deals that benefit all parties. The WTO is also empowered to hold states 
accountable should they defect from those deals at the expense of their 
trading partners. 
The existence of an independent body capable of acting separate from 
member states is a critical feature of an international organization.41 IOs 
often have both secretariats and plenary bodies in which states are directly 
represented—compare, for example, the UN Secretariat to the UN General 
Assembly. When we discuss vertical conflict between member states and 
IOs, we are primarily concerned about conflict between member states and 
these independent bodies; the more independent the IO organs, the greater 
the possibility of vertical conflict. 
While delegation to an IO can mitigate horizontal conflict, it often gives 
way to another conflict—vertical conflict. Vertical conflict is where states (as 
principals) delegate power to an IO (as an agent), and the IO starts to behave 
opportunistically and in a manner contrary to the preferences of the member 
states that empowered it. This opportunistic behavior by an agent is often 
called “agency slack.”42 We build on existing work on principal-agent 
conflict in IOs by illustrating how having multiple states as principals, as 
opposed to a single principal, further aggravates this conflict. 
The vertical conflict between states collectively on the one hand and 
IOs on the other begins the moment IOs are created. It is considered a 
common phenomenon, stemming from states delegating important tasks to 
independent and centralized bureaucracies.43 IOs’ undesirable behaviors can 
take many forms, including shirking their responsibilities, or allocating 
                                               
40 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 3. 
41 See JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 6 (2006) (noting 
that in identifying IOs’ distinguishing legal characteristics “there is wide agreement among lawyers that 
three elements are important, namely (1) establishment by international agreement between states; (2) 
of at least one organ distinct from member states and capable of so acting; and (3) under international 
law.”); see generally Kristina Daugirdas, How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations, 57 
HARV. J. INT’L L. 325 (2016) (discussing how jus cogens, general international law, and treaties all bind 
international organizations); Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation and the Responsibility of International 
Organizations 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 991 (2015) (exploring why it is significant for all IO organs to comply 
with international law in order to maintain their reputations). 
42 See generally DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
16. 
43 Alvarez, supra note 41, at 9–29. 
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resources to initiatives not initially envisioned by the founding states. Some 
forms of agency slack—such as when IO staff obtain higher pay for less 
work than their principals called for—are widely criticized. Other forms of 
agency slack, however, are praised by other actors, while displeasing to state-
principals. For example, many praised World Health Organization doctors’ 
decisions to “[go] on the offensive against China,” investigate SARS, and 
issue travel advisories without respecting diplomatic protocol and the 
WHO’s own rules.44 Similarly, environmentalists have praised WTO 
appellate body decisions to interpret free trade rules liberally to include 
environmental concerns, even though key member states argued 
otherwise.45 
The extent of vertical conflict depends on the degree of delegation that 
has taken place. As a result, the agent’s operating space—its “zone of 
discretion”—is often the most consequential strategic decision the 
principals undertake when they first create the IO. In law and economics 
terms, this zone is determined by the sum of various competences explicitly 
(or implicitly) delegated to the IO, minus the control instruments the 
principals establish to curtail the agent’s discretion.46 A principal’s capacity 
to control the agent is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the agent’s 
zone of discretion.47 
Different IOs enjoy varying degrees of discretion. Some IOs possess 
very limited powers, and remain largely or entirely within the tight control 
of the principals. For example, the UN Secretariat exercises little 
independent control over UN Security Council decisions, although it does 
enjoy significant administrative powers in other areas.48 Each resolution 
reflects an outcome firmly rooted in the Council members’ domestic policy 
positions at any time. The UN Secretariat does not decide whether to 
impose economic sanctions or undertake military action.49 The UN also 
does not contribute troops to missions.50 In these instances, the main 
purpose of the UN as an IO is to provide an umbrella under which the 
                                               
44 Andrew P. Cortell & Susan Peterson, Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting 
Rules, and Slavk in the WHO and WTO, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 255, 270 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. 
Tierney eds., 2006). 
45 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998). 
46 Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution, in THE JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 45 (Alec Stone Sweet ed., 2004). 
47 Id. 
48 See generally RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW TRUSTEESHIP?: THE INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION OF WAR TORN TERRITORIES (2002). 
49 Those powers belong to the Security Council. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41 & 47; see also 
Functions and Powers, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
50 Although that was envisioned by the UN Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 43. 
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horizontal conflicts can play out in a predictable and rule-based 
environment. 
The EU is different. EU institutions enjoy a large array of supra-national 
competences and independent decision-making powers. In some areas of 
EU law, such as trade or competition policy, delegation to the Commission 
is nearly complete, giving it almost unlimited discretion.51 The Commission 
also has full discretion to bring infringement proceedings against member 
states that violate EU law.52 This power (and frequent practice) of the 
Commission to sue member states makes it difficult to even portray the 
Commission as an agent within the control of the principals that initially 
created it.53 The extent of delegation to the WTO, on the other hand, falls 
somewhere in the middle: the process of negotiating trade agreements 
remains largely member driven,54 with the WTO Secretariat carrying little 
influence beyond convening members for trade talks. At the same time, the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism with a permanent Appellate Body 
entails significant delegation, vesting it with the authority to impose large 
costs on individual states.55 
IO discretion, combined with the limited ability of states to monitor and 
sanction the IO, are the key preconditions for a vertical conflict to emerge. 
Yet vertical conflicts can manifest in many ways. For example, IO 
secretariats typically request bigger budgets than member states are willing 
to allocate, often call for more powers at the supra-national level than 
member states want to grant, and even take on projects many member states 
disagree with. Moreover, as IOs mature, they tend to gain confidence in 
their ability to self-govern, which leads them to gradually develop their own 
agendas. As a consequence, their agendas start to diverge from the original 
purpose underlying the delegation and the IO’s existence. Some call this 
“mission creep,” a term used to describe the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Somalia, which evolved from a small-scale humanitarian mission to a fatal 
military confrontation and campaign to effect long-term stability in the war-
torn country.56 The WTO has likewise been accused of straying beyond its 
                                               
51 See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
207, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47. 
52 Legal Enforcement: The Infringements Procedure, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/procedure.htm (last updated June 8, 2016). 
53 See Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 
2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 103–05 (2001). This has led some commentators to describe the EU 
Commission as a “trustee” rather than as an agent as its powers exceed those of a typical agent. See id. 
at 114–15. 
54 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
55 See, e.g., Canada Awarded Right to $1B in WTO Trade Sanctions Against U.S. over Meat-Labelling 
Rules, CBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-u-s-meat-
labelling-wto-1.3354048. 
56 Ben Zimmer, ‘Mission Creep’ Crawls out of the ‘90s, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-long-voyage-of-mission-creep-1403901268. 
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original mission, as it has expanded its agenda to areas beyond traditional 
trade matters, such as intellectual property protection.57 Critics can also 
reasonably characterize many EU actions as mission creep, citing the 
expansion of its competences from economic to social policies, its recent 
forays into invasive financial regulation, and its allocation of migrant 
quotas.58 This systematic growth in EU competences and move toward an 
“even-closer union” was a central concern motivating the U.K. referendum 
that triggered the country’s impending exit from the EU.59 
Agency slack does not only come in the form of an IO drifting from its 
original mission. The agent can also behave opportunistically within the 
confines of its core policy area. The IMF staff, for example, is accused of 
pursuing unduly large loans, coupled with excessive conditions.60 In doing 
so, the IMF staff is perceived to engage in rent-seeking in an effort to 
maximize its power, autonomy and influence, all at the expense of the 
Fund’s policy objectives and resources.61 
International courts and tribunals can also become wayward agents. 
Independent tribunals sometimes make decisions that not only displease the 
losing party, but also the member states that formed the tribunal. For 
example, Rachel Cichowski, who analyzed ECJ case law in the social policy 
and environmental area,62 found not only that citizen suits challenging 
national legislation typically succeed, and thus displease the member state 
being sued, but that other states’ interventions to guide the ECJ are often 
ignored by the ECJ. Instead of aligning with intervening member states, the 
ECJ is much more likely to align with the positions of another supra-
national actor: the EU Commission. This happens in over 90% of cases 
studied.63 Meanwhile, Eric Posner notes the decline of member states’ use 
                                               
57 THIERRY BAUDET, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS 136 (2012).  
58 Arnaldo Abruzzini, EU Social Dialogue ‘Mission Creep,’ EURACTIV (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/eu-social-dialogue-mission-creep/; 
Harry Wilson, ‘Mission Creep’ Fears Surround EU Watchdogs, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7982936/Mission-creep-fears-
surround-EU-watchdogs.html.  
59 Palmeri, supra note 1. 
60 EUR. NETWORK ON DEBT & DEV., WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A 
DEVELOPMENT INJUSTICE 18–19 (2006), 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad_world_bank_and_imf_conditi
onality_report.pdf; China and the World: Yuan for All, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21641203-chinas-loans-foundering-governments-may-
seem-challenge-imf-biggest-risks-are; Ian Vásquez, The International Monetary Fund: Challenges and 
Contradictions, CATO INST. (Sept. 28, 1999), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-
testimony/international-monetary-fund-challenges-contradictions. 
61 See Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 54. 
62 See generally CICHOWSKI, supra note 9. 
63 See id. at 137 tbl.4.5, 139 tbl.4.6; Rachel A. Cichowski, Women’s Rights, the European Court, and 
Supranational Constitutionalism, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 489, 495 tbl.1, 497 tbl.2 (2004). 
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of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) due to this partial track record of 
judges.64 
2. Conditions That Exacerbate Vertical Conflicts 
The severity of vertical conflict varies across different areas of 
cooperation and strategic situations. Vertical conflicts are prone to be 
especially acute when the mission of the IO is broad or loosely defined. This is 
because a broad IO mission allows agents to pick and choose among various 
priorities, where mission creep can set in quickly. Vertical problems are also 
likely to be acute when the IO is charged with a task requiring specific 
expertise. In such a context, IO staffs often enjoy significant informational 
advantages vis-à-vis state-principals, and can use them to pursue agent 
priorities, like greater internationalization. For example, the European 
Commission antitrust decisions involve highly technical analysis, making the 
Commission’s antitrust policy less amenable to state control—whether ex 
ante or ex post. Accordingly, these types of decisions are often seen as highly 
intrusive, with wide and troubling consequences for some.  
In addition, heterogeneity of preferences among state principals could 
worsen the vertical conflict. Mark Copelovitch shows empirically how the 
IMF is able to exploit the divisions among its five most powerful 
shareholders, engaging in more extensive lending in instances where the “G-
5” remain most divided.65 In his model, the preferences of the less important 
IMF shareholders are irrelevant, suggesting that it is the heterogeneity 
among the key players that matters. 
3. Ways to Mitigate Vertical Conflicts 
Both rationalist and constructivist scholarship explain why delegation 
entails significant costs. The fear of agency slack may lead principals to 
confer carefully delineated powers to the agent. Yet such a strategy directly 
reduces the benefits of delegation. If the WTO’s powers were strictly 
confined to furthering liberalization of trade in goods, all the benefits 
associated with the conclusion of trade talks on services and intellectual 
property (IP)—the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreements—would be lost. Similarly, budgetary control is often a double-
edged sword for member states to use. Curtailing the agent’s budget may 
effectively restrain the agent, but it also denies the agent the requisite 
                                               
64 See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (John M. Olin Program in Law 
& Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004). 
65 Copelovitch, supra note 27. 
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resources to carry out the tasks principals have delegated to it.66 If France, 
for instance, is unhappy with the way the European Commission conducts 
Common Agricultural Policy, the budget cuts would not only penalize and 
disempower the Commission, but also stymie the objectives of a policy area 
that France strongly supports. Thus, budgetary control is only available 
when principals are willing to accept the incidental adverse effects such 
budgetary controls cause to the policy objectives they endorse. 
While game-theoretic models lend some alternative ways to reduce these 
agency costs, such as selecting agents with particular traits, monitoring them 
closely, rewarding compliance and punishing non-compliance, these 
techniques are very hard to effect without significantly reducing the benefits 
of delegation.67 Yet, any principal-agent model presumes that when 
delegation takes place, principals must anticipate ex ante that the expected 
benefits of such delegation must outweigh the costs. 
We argue that these difficulties, which increase the costs of delegation, 
are greater in IOs than other bureaucracies, because IOs have multiple 
principals with competing desires, and because IOs have large and 
independent bureaucracies with their own institutional cultures. Both of 
these factors—multiple principals and IO institutional cultures—have been 
bracketed by the most current research on delegation to IOs, including the 
2006 Hawkins et al. edited volume, and the related special issue in IO.68 
More specifically, Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, the 
foremost authors examining the question of multiple principals, recommend 
modeling the states constituting IOs as a single collective principal with a 
single ideal point, rather than as multiple principals with distinct ideal 
points.69 While this approach would simplify formal modeling, it would also 
set aside some of the key features that make delegation to IOs so 
challenging. Similarly, these authors—and others in the rationalist tradition 
more generally—warn against “attributing primary causal weight for IO 
behavior to organizational culture or charismatic leadership.”70 Against 
these warnings, we intend to develop such arguments below. 
 
                                               
66 Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 475, 487 (1987); Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the 
European Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99, 117 (1997). 
67 See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 25 (1991); DELEGATION AND 
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 16, at 25. 
68 DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 16; 
Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett, supra note 16; Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 16; Swank, 
supra note 16; Lee & Strang, supra note 16; Gleditsch & Ward, supra note 16; Gilligan, supra note 
16; Pevehouse & Russett, supra note 16; Nooruddin & Simmons, supra note 16. 
69 Mona M. Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Who Delegates? Alternative Models of 
Principals in Development Aid, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
41–42 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006). 
70 Id. at 43. 
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*** 
 
The next section will move beyond examining horizontal and vertical 
conflicts, either in isolation or relative to each other. Rather, the next section 
will explain how particular institutional design choices common to IOs—
such as super-majority voting rules, international personnel selection and 
promotion rules, location choices, and the scope of the IO mission—
significantly exacerbate the costs of delegation, and hence the vertical 
conflict. We also explain why these seemingly problematic institutional 
design features are so common: they were put in place when the IOs were 
created to resolve what was seen as a more pressing conflict—the horizontal 
conflict among states. 
III. THEORY: HOW HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONFLICTS 
INTERSECT 
A. Institutions That Help Solve Distributional Conflict Worsen Agency Conflict 
The following paragraphs discuss some institutional forms that are very 
common to IOs, such as voting rules, the rules governing IO staff, the 
location of the IO, and the scope of the IO mandate. For each institutional 
feature, the discussion aims to establish two points. First, it aims to show 
how many of these institutional features were erected to help solve the 
distributional conflicts among states at the time the IO was established. 
Next, it aims to show how these institutional features can worsen the vertical 
conflict between member states collectively, and between the IO’s 
independent bodies. We argue this conflict will likely worsen over time as 
the IO gains stability, develops its own organizational culture, and expands 
its powers and budget. 
1. Voting Rules and IO Decision-Making 
Of the many institutional design features of IOs, voting rules are an 
appropriate place to start, as they clearly reflect individual states’ power and 
control over the organization. Two decision-making rules involving voting 
are very common to IOs. First, IO decisions are rarely made with simple 
majorities of states, but typically require super-majorities, and often 
unanimity. Second is the principle of one-state-one-vote. Both rules, we 
argue, were initially established to allow states interested in protecting their 
sovereignty to minimize the horizontal conflicts with other states involved 
in the international organization. Over time, however, we show how these 
rules worsen states’ collective ability to resolve vertical conflict, and allow 
wayward secretariats and tribunals to proceed on initiatives that states 
collectively may not desire. 
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Historically, unanimity was the default decision-making rule in IOs.71 
While many organizations have relaxed this rule to require only a super-
majority, it is still uncommon to find bodies with simple majority voting, the 
UN General Assembly constituting a notable exception. Moreover, even 
bodies that formally allow decisions to proceed without unanimous consent 
of their members, such as the European Union, the World Trade 
Organization, the IMF and the World Bank, in fact typically try to reach 
consensus. When IOs are formed, unanimity and super-majority rules give 
states increased confidence that other states will not easily be able to trample 
over their national interests. Indeed, the more diverse an international 
organization’s membership, the more likely it is to require all of its decisions 
to be made unanimously.72 
Unanimity also has well-recognized costs. Most notably, it creates biases 
in favor of the status quo, and frequently leads IOs to inaction. The failure 
of the League of Nations to stop World War II is a tragic illustration of 
status quo bias. In recognition of the perils of this bias, UN Security Council 
rules do not require unanimity, except among the five permanent Council 
Members. Similarly, a super-majority support among all fifteen Council 
Members is required. However, even this requirement may be too 
burdensome. Many critics argue it leaves the Security Council unable to 
intervene to prevent grave humanitarian catastrophes.73 Moreover, such 
unanimity rules have deadlocked the WTO negotiations launched back in 
2001, leading states to formally abandon trade talks in 2015.74 The WTO’s 
established practice is to require consensus despite the existence of super-
majority voting rules in the IO’s charter, which has all but paralyzed the 
institution as membership has grown and consensus has become harder to 
reach. 
We acknowledge the costs embedded in the frequent deadlocks and 
status quo bias that follow from sovereignty-protecting voting rules. At the 
same time, our critique of super-majority and unanimity requirements is 
different: we argue these high thresholds empower independent IO 
secretariats and tribunals, at the expense of the member states of the 
organization. In other words, once power has been delegated to one of these 
bodies, it becomes difficult for member states to muster the requisite votes 
to repudiate a wayward agent. For example, many ECJ decisions have 
dismayed EU member states by interpreting EU treaties in ways that move 
                                               
71 WERNER J. FELF, ROBERT S. JORDAN & LEON HURWITZ, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (3d ed. 1994). 
72 Daniel J. Blake & Autumn Lockwood Payton, Decision Making in International Organizations: 
An Interest Based Approach to Voting Rule Selection 26 (Jan. 9, 2009) (working paper) (on file with 
author). 
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power away from national capitals and toward EU institutions.75 However, 
it has been almost impossible for EU governments to correct the ECJ’s 
course, since course-correcting the ECJ would often require legislative 
action in the form of a treaty change, and hence an extraordinary degree of 
consensus among member states.76 
Another peculiar IO decision-making feature is that many IOs couple a 
one-state-one-vote rule with a rule requiring each state to contribute to the 
organization’s budget roughly in proportion to the state’s wealth. The one-
state-one-vote principal is common to IOs—each member of the UN 
General Assembly, the WTO, the World Health Organization’s Assembly, 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency, among other bodies, gets the 
same voting power.77 This allocation is not exactly democratic, as a citizen 
of the Maldives gets roughly a thousand times more voting power than a 
citizen of China.78 Nevertheless, it is often put in place to guarantee notions 
of formal sovereign equality, thereby ensuring states joining the organization 
that their interests will not easily be superseded by those of larger states. 
After all, if votes were allocated based on population, China and India would 
control the global IOs, which would dissuade other states from joining such 
bodies.79 That said, in the one IO most closely resembling a federation—
the European Union—votes have been accorded in greater proportion to 
national populations over time. 
Importantly, the one-state-one-vote rule (or even voting in proportion 
to population) is typically combined with a rule calling for richer states to 
contribute more to the organization’s budget. In 2010, for example, the 165 
poorest UN members contributed only 7% of the organization’s budget, 
despite having a clear majority of votes in UN bodies.80 
This mismatch between voting and financing creates another super-
majority hurdle: for an IO proposal to go forward, it needs the support of 
                                               
75 For discussion of an activist ECJ, see Rachel A. Cichowski, Integrating the Environment: The 
European Court and the Construction of Supranational Policy, 5 J. EUR. POL’Y 387, 387 (1998); Alter, supra 
note 8; Weiler, supra note 8. 
76 See generally Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schultz, The European Court of Justice, 
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149 (1998). 
77 Additional (but obviously non-exhaustive) examples of the one-state-one-vote configuration 
include the Organization of American States General Assembly, the Congress of the World 
Meteorological Organization, International Whaling Commission, and the assembly of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization. See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34, 
Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention of the World Meteorological Organization art. 10, Oct. 11, 
1947, 77 U.N.T.S. 143; Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 48(b), Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 
295; INT’L WHALING COMM’N, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND FINANCIAL REGULATIONS § E(1) (Oct. 
10, 2014), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=.  
78 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More 
Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 4 (2001). 
79 Id. 
80 MARJORIE ANN BROWNE & LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30605, 
UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET CONTRIBUTIONS: MEMBERS COMPARED, 1990–2010 23 
(2013). 
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both the states that formally vote on proposals, and the rich states that 
effectively control the budget. As with other super-majority requirements, 
this makes it harder to initially delegate tasks, but also makes it harder to roll 
back IO efforts that many members do not like. As such, budget 
negotiations in the United Nations and EU are typically protracted and 
painful affairs, precisely because major financial contributors leverage 
budget negotiations as a tool to exercise greater control over the 
organization, while the IO Secretariat, and sometimes smaller states, resist. 
Conversely, in IOs where voting and financing are more closely aligned, 
such as the IMF and World Bank, there are fewer conflicts over the budget. 
The mismatch between formal votes and budget negotiations can lead 
IOs to move forward with policies that many member states oppose. EU 
budget expenditures toward the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one 
prominent example. Put in place to support French farmers in 1958, these 
farming subsidies constitute over 40% of the EU budget today,81 and 
have been highly criticized ever since as wasteful and poorly designed 
agricultural policy.82 They have also been criticized as costly to European 
consumers, unfair to EU states with small agricultural sectors, and 
detrimental to the developing world.83 While CAP has indeed been 
slightly modified, it still has a cost exceeding forty billion euro annually, 
despite the EU only having fourteen million farmers (and a total 
population of 740 million).84 Many member states have tried fighting 
CAP, both in the Council of Ministers and EU budget negotiations. 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1984 budget negotiations were perhaps the sharpest 
and most successful, but even Thatcher failed in radically reforming this 
policy. Instead, she merely succeeded in reducing the U.K.’s contribution 
to the CAP budget.85 The decades-long continuation of controversial 
policies like CAP underscores how difficult it can be to alter the course 
of an IO, in part because of voting rules requiring extraordinary 
consensus among member states, and because of protracted battles over 
financing the IO’s (already disputed) mission. 
                                               
81 See CAP Expenditure in the Total EU Expenditure, EUR. COMMISSION (Mar. 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf; Charlie Dunmore, Farm 
Subsidies Still Get Top Share of EU Austerity Budget, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/eu-budget-agriculture-
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82 Posner, supra note 64.  
83 Common Agricultural Policy, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Agricultural_Policy (last updated Nov. 20, 2017). 
84 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Agriculture in Europe—Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. 
COMMISSION (June 26, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/faq/index_en.htm. 
85 See Bruno Waterfield, EU Tries to Grab £6bn from Britain’s EU Rebate, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 15, 
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2. Rules Governing IO Staff and Leaders 
Staffing choices are another crucial aspect of IO operations. Modern IO 
staffing rules are like those of many national bureaucracies, insofar as they 
involve competitive examinations for entry, and long-term tenure thereafter. 
In other ways, however, IOs have unique staffing rules, including hiring 
rules that encourage a nationally diverse staff, privileging of people who 
speak many of the IO’s working languages,86 and committing IO staff to be 
loyal to the IO rather than to their state of nationality.87 The UN staff, for 
example, consists of career civil servants from all of its member states.88 The 
staff generally shares an extensive background in international affairs, and a 
certain commitment to multinationalism and international order, as 
evidenced by their career choice. The UN’s competitive salary structure and 
commitment to the so-called “noblemaire principle,” which sets the UN 
career civil servants’ salaries by reference to the highest-paying national civil 
services, ensures that it can draw civil servants from all over the world.89 
UN recruitment further emphasizes the importance of international 
experience, foreign language skills, and an ability to work on multicultural 
teams.90 
Political bargains often determine how IO heads will be selected. These 
rules, we argue, were designed to help states protect against being placed in 
a disadvantaged position in subsequent interactions with other states. For 
example, the U.S. wanted to know in future disputes with France that a 
neutral arbiter, rather than a French national who was loyal to the French 
state, would make key decisions that affected all members. Similarly, insofar 
as IO jobs are plum positions, many states wanted to get their fair share of 
these rewards. We argue, however, that these rules sharpen the conflict 
between states collectively, on the one hand, and independent IO bodies, 
on the other. Over time, IO staffs form a multi-national and multi-lingual 
community, which orient themselves toward the IO and its supra-national 
goals, and away from the agendas of national capitals. 
IO rules typically specify that personnel must come from many 
countries, namely because when states form an IO, they anticipate disputes 
with other member states, and want a neutral body to adjudicate such 
                                               
86 U.N. Charter art. 101; William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: 
A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 354–359 (2001). 
87 See generally, JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2006); 
see also THOMAS FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE UN DREAM AND 
WHAT THE US CAN DO ABOUT IT (1985). 
88 See Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations 93, 95, 
ST/SGB/2014/1 (Jan. 1, 2014). 
89 Salaries & Post Adjustment, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
90 As an example for a posting for career opportunities at UN, see International Professional Staff, 
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disputes. States may also want the presence of someone from their own state 
to articulate their national point of view to decision-makers. The rules 
governing the composition of the International Court of Justice illustrate 
this concern: each country can have only one judge appointed to the ICJ,91 
and parties to a dispute have the option of appointing a judge from their 
country to the court, if one is not already present.92 Similarly, each EU 
country gets to appoint one commissioner and one judge to both the ECJ 
and General Court. The IMF staff consists of 2,400 members representing 
143 countries.93 These engrained practices show how many countries see IO 
appointments as valuable goods to be distributed fairly among member 
states. 
Even IO members that initially seem most loyal to their home 
jurisdiction may find themselves serving the IO’s goals instead of, or in 
parallel with, the goals of their home constituency. For example, members 
of the European Parliament—the democratically elected body to which EU 
member states delegate legislative functions—are chosen as a result of 
national elections.94 French people vote among the French candidates, and 
Spanish people among the Spanish candidates, both competing for 
predetermined quotas reserved for France and Spain in the European 
Parliament.95 However, after being elected, important committee 
assignments and other leadership positions within the European Parliament 
are chosen by European-level parties, which carry agendas removed from 
individual national priorities. Accordingly, a French conservative member 
of the European Parliament (MEP) can no longer maximize his influence 
by maximizing the French interest at every turn. Instead, he must cater to 
the preferences of the European People’s Party, whose leaders hail from 
different EU member states. These European-level political organizations 
will determine the career prospects of this MEP once elected, thus creating 
incentives for MEPs to substitute their narrow national interests for broader 
European agendas. 
IO personnel are typically career civil-servants within the IO; they are 
not seconded from national bureaucracies for short stints. This move from 
multi-national to international staffing was pioneered by the League of 
Nations and its contemporary institutions—the International Labor 
                                               
91 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
92 Id. at art. 31.  
93 Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 56. 
94 It is debatable whether the EP can be modeled as an agent of the MSs. The MSs created the 
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Organization and Permanent Court of International Justice.96 Before that, 
IO secretariats were generally staffed by temporary secondments from 
national administrations.97 Indeed, in some cases, like in the Universal Postal 
Union, IO staff is recruited and organized on a national basis under the 
administrative control of individual governments.98 And while selection of 
IO staff on the basis of competitive examinations is now commonplace, it 
was controversial at least until the 1970s, as developing countries and 
countries affiliated with the Soviet Union wanted more freedom to use IO 
staffing as a way to offer patronage to political allies.99 
While rules creating a multi-national, independent staff help states 
ensure the IO is not controlled by a single powerful country, they also 
weaken the position of states collectively vis-à-vis the IO bureaucracy. Such 
rules can lead to the selection of persons who have pro-international values, 
and who are thus presumed to be more effective and successful 
professionals in the international setting. These individuals, however, often 
have weaker attachments to the nation state. Also, by interacting primarily 
with people from foreign nationalities over time, IO personnel might 
become more internationally-minded than when initially hired. Moreover, 
once promotion opportunities depend less on political connections at home, 
and more on integration within a multi-national bureaucracy, IO staff have 
a natural career incentive to pay less attention to politics at home, and more 
attention to the organization’s internationalist goals. For example, due to 
selection, socialization, career, and other reasons, personnel from the 
European Commission are far more likely to feel attached to the European 
identity than other Europeans.100 According to Liesbet Hooghe’s survey 
research, while over 40% of Europeans in general felt no attachment to 
Europe and only felt attached to their nation states, 0% of European 
Commission staff felt the same absence of attachment.101 To take another 
example, Antje Wiener conducted wide-ranging interviews in London, 
Berlin, and Brussels—three prominent political arenas in which IO elites 
operate.102 She found that compared to elites stationed in London or Berlin, 
and controlling for nationality, elites stationed in Brussels made very 
different associations.103 Wiener concluded that this more “diffused” and 
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“flexible” pattern of associative norms found in Brussels is indicative of 
the deconstruction of national identities.104 
Several additional IO rules advance this tendency among IO staff to 
develop an internationalist identity and discard loyalty to their home 
state. For example, IO hiring typically gives preferences to people who 
speak multiple languages, especially the working or official languages of 
the IOs. This helps create internationalist identities. Additionally, many 
IOs have rules requiring personnel to be loyal to the organization—not 
to their home country. For example, the ECJ does not issue dissenting 
opinions, so as to shield the judges from pressures to support their 
national positions.105 This enhances neutrality, but reinforces prior 
tendencies of IOs to develop loyalty to the institution, and away from 
national capitals. In all, these rules advance IO neutrality and the 
resolution of distributional conflicts among member states, but worsen 
states’ collective ability to control the IO.  
Some IOs’ hiring rules require both national diversity and 
professional homogeneity. For example, doctors dominate WHO 
positions, while economists dominate the World Bank and IMF.106 In 
general, professional specialization both increases the advantages of 
delegation and worsens the agency problem. The more specialized an 
agent becomes vis-à-vis its principal, the better able it is to control the 
information reaching the principal and lead politicians monitoring the 
bodies toward adopting policies preferred by the technical staff. In the 
IO context in particular, national diversity, combined with professional 
uniformity, can increase ties among staff of different nationalities, and 
increase the sense of an internationalist IO mission, separate from the 
concerns of national leaders. 
One way states can maintain control over wayward IO bureaucracies 
is through control of IO leadership. IO heads are typically picked on the 
basis of political criteria, and they do not always have long tenures with 
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105 Roland Flamini, Judicial Reach: The Ever-Expanding European Court of Justice, WORLD AFF. 
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https://www.imf.org/external/about/staff.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“The IMF currently 
employs about 2,400 staff, half of whom are economists.”); About WHO: WHO People and Offices, 
WHO, http://www.who.int/about/structure/en/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“In addition to medical 
doctors, public health specialists, scientists and epidemiologists, WHO staff include people trained to 
manage administrative, financial, and information systems, as well as experts in the fields of health 
statistics, economics and emergency relief.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333187 
2018] UNINTENDED AGENCY PROBLEMS  189 
the organization.107 These appointment rules create incentives for IO 
heads to pay more heed to the concerns of national capitals, and arguably 
give IO heads less time to be socialized into internationalist cultures. 
That said, IO leadership positions, like IO staff positions, are typically 
allocated on the basis of national bargains. For example, a European 
typically heads the IMF, while an American typically heads the World 
Bank.108 According to scholars of delegation, this means the pool of 
qualified candidates is shallower than it otherwise would be, so it is hard 
for states to pick agents that best represent their collective preferences.109 
Moreover, because IOs are highly specialized, it is often the case that 
IO heads have long prior experiences with the organization and its 
internationalist tendencies. A recent battle over the head of the European 
Commission illustrates that the selection of IO heads may not offer 
powerful states much leeway to select loyal candidates and thus control 
the organization. Most recently, Jean-Claude Juncker was chosen to head 
the powerful EU Commission.110 A powerful EU state—the U.K.—
opposed his candidacy very publicly and forcefully, threatening to hasten a 
referendum on exit from the EU should he be selected.111 According to then 
U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, Juncker’s extensive European 
experience was not a qualification, but a reason to disqualify him, as it made 
him more likely to support further EU integration, rather than support the 
idea of key powers remaining with national capitals.112 Nevertheless, these 
arguments did not carry the day. Despite a strong crisis of EU legitimacy, a 
powerful Eurocrat was chosen to lead the Commission. In his first years in 
office, Juncker has already exhibited inclinations our theory would predict: 
he is methodically expanding the reach of the European institutions to 
address both the migration and financial crises, he is acquiring new and 
controversial powers for the Commission, and he is consequently deepening 
vertical conflict, much to the dismay of critics within member states. 
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3. Physical Locations of IOs 
Another important choice facing states when designing IOs is the 
location of headquarters. Several governments typically lobby to locate IOs 
within their home territories, ideally in their capital cities, to ensure the IO 
most closely aligns with their national interests. However, other 
governments fear such an arrangement, since it would enable the host 
country to exercise undue influence over the IO. Consequently, IOs are 
rarely located in the capital city of its most powerful member. Rather, more 
remote countries and cities are often chosen because of their expected 
neutrality. While such a choice may resolve the horizontal distributional 
conflict at the IO’s founding, we argue that it worsens the vertical agency 
conflict down the line. When IO secretariats are far from key national 
capitals, they increasingly experience a different daily reality than that of 
national leaders, and receive less frequent and pressing lobbying from 
leaders and lobbyists in the national capital. This separation begets the 
development of an IO-specific subculture. This is especially likely for IOs 
located in relatively small and remote cities, where international staff 
constitute a substantial minority and live in a separate bubble, interacting 
primarily with one another.113 This argument depends critically on the 
assumption that IO staff are socialized differently because they interact 
heavily with other IO staff; this argument should work less well when 
socialization processes take a different form. 
Some examples help illustrate these dynamics. Let us start with perhaps 
the most integrated international organization today—the European Union. 
First established in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), it consisted of three large member states—Germany, France, and 
Italy—and three very small ones—the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg.114 Each jostled for influence, seeking to place the 
headquarters in its territory, ideally in its capital. German and Italian cities, 
however, were never serious contenders, in part because the legacy of World 
War II was still vivid.115 More interestingly, Paris turned out to be equally 
objectionable, precisely because it was the national capital of a powerful 
state.116 Luxembourg was chosen as the best location for the ECSC 
secretariat precisely “because it had nothing of ‘real capital’ about it.”117 At 
the same time, the European Parliament was placed in Strasbourg “because 
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it was the only city that could house the European Parliament in a non-
national building, that of the Council of Europe.”118 Finally, six years later, 
Brussels—another relatively small capital—was picked to house the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom.119 The European 
Court of Justice was placed in Luxembourg for the same set of reasons.120 
Today, the European Parliament primarily operates from Brussels, but 
because of France’s resistance, the Parliament must decamp from Brussels 
to its original home, Strasbourg, for a week every month.121 The fact that 
several thousand politicians and staff, together with truckloads carrying 
some 2,500 plastic trunks, make the 300-mile journey from Brussels to 
Strasbourg every month—at a great expense to European taxpayers—
reflects the salience of the conflict over the geographic location of IOs.122 
Placing IO headquarters at a distance from powerful foreign states’ 
capitals may seem like a good way to solve the distributional conflict among 
states and ensure that a foreign state does not get undue influence over the 
IO. We argue, however, that this may worsen states’ ability collectively to 
control a wayward IO bureaucracy. Namely, it may allow IO staff to live in 
their own separate bubble, far from the pressures facing elected leaders in 
national capitals. This is precisely what many believe has happened in the 
modern de facto EU capital—Brussels. 
About 100,000 EU expats live in Brussels, constituting over 10% of the 
city’s population.123 EU expats often “live among themselves” in “luxury 
ghettos” around the European district.124 Recent surveys confirm that 
expats interact mostly with other expats—rather than with Belgians—send 
their children to international schools, and rarely participate in local 
elections.125 Under these conditions, it is no wonder that EU staff develop 
a strong EU identity, as illustrated in repeated surveys.126 
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Figure 1 above suggests that while Brussels is by far the city with the 
most IO headquarters, relatively small and distant European cities, such as 
Geneva and Vienna, also attract many IOs. This figure is perhaps most 
striking because Washington and Moscow, capitals of the two most 
powerful states for much of the post-WWII period, are not in the top ten 
cities of IO headquarters. This illustrates that neutral locations, far from 
enemy capitals, are often preferred by negotiating states prioritizing the 
horizontal conflict. This logic is not unique to IOs—after all, U.S. states 
forming a federal system chose Washington, D.C. as the location of the new 
federal state, precisely because it constituted a rural backwater.128 
That said, while Figure 1 suggests that most IOs are located in relatively 
remote cities, some IOs are in powerful national capitals. Prominent among 
them are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both 
headquartered in Washington, D.C. This decision was made in March 1946, 
when delegates from thirty-five countries met in Savannah, Georgia.129 
While most expected the headquarters to be in the U.S., delegates from the 
U.K. and many other countries argued for the headquarters to be removed 
from direct D.C. influence to New York City, along with the UN 
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headquarters and the big banks.130 However, as John Maynard Keynes 
highlighted, U.S. Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson, head of the U.S. 
delegation, “had no great difficulty in railroading” the decision to seat these 
bodies in Washington through the conference.131 In addition, historiography 
on the founding of the World Bank and IMF suggests that a different type 
of isolation was envisioned. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
argued that new institutions such as the World Bank and IMF should be 
“instrumentalities of sovereign governments and not of private financial 
interests.”132 This meant that the headquarters of private finance, New York 
and London, should be avoided.133 
Another example of where to situate an international body comes from 
the most prominent modern IO—the United Nations. While Geneva, 
Switzerland was an early proposed location for the UN,134 delegates from 
many countries quickly decided the UN would have its seat in the United 
States, both to reflect the new post-WWII realities, and to distance the body 
from its discredited predecessor, the League of Nations.135 But the question 
then became: where in the United States? Over forty cities were on an initial 
list to host the UN, including San Francisco, New York, Boston, Baltimore, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans.136 What was notably missing from 
this list is the U.S. capital—Washington, D.C.137 Indeed, in December 1945, 
the UN Committee considering the headquarters question also eliminated 
Philadelphia from an early list, lest it was too close to Washington, enabling 
the U.S. government to exert undue influence on the UN.138 Ultimately, a 
year later, a dramatic, unexpected, and generous offer from John D. 
Rockefeller to buy a six-block area along the East River and donate it to the 
UN resolved the controversy in favor of New York City.139 What is 
important to recall here is that at the peak of U.S. power and legitimacy—
the end of World War II—governments lobbied for the UN headquarters 
not to be built in Washington, D.C., and succeeded. 
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4. Broad IO Mandates and Mission Creep 
The scope of an IO’s mandate is one of the critical decisions states must 
make when setting up an IO. When states’ interests diverge, the easiest way 
to resolve the disagreement is by broadening the bargaining zone within 
which a compromise could be identified. Adding new items to the 
bargaining table, for example, often ensures the diverging interests of 
various states can be satisfied. When the agenda is broad enough, every state 
can find something to justify their participation in the IO. The IO mandate 
can also be left ambiguous so that each state can interpret it in a manner 
consistent with its interests. Vesting the IO with a broad or flexible mandate 
is therefore often an effective response to a horizontal conflict. However, 
vertical conflict looms large every time the IO mission is broadly or loosely 
defined. Such a structure invites opportunistic behavior by an IO’s 
bureaucracy, and often leads to mission creep, where an IO strays beyond 
its initial mandate. This is because a broadly defined mandate expands the 
agent’s powers and makes it harder to monitor the agent’s performance 
effectively. Moreover, a loosely defined mandate creates a problem of 
incomplete contracting, where the agent’s mandate is only partially specified 
ex ante, heightening the need for enhanced monitoring ex post. Both broad 
and loose mandates therefore make it easier for the agent to deviate from 
its mission and behave opportunistically. 
Mission creep is largely recognized as a phenomenon that undermines 
international cooperation.140 Critics have focused on the problem of 
legitimacy, as well as the disparity between broad IO mandates and IO 
resources. These features, critics assert, undermine the IO’s ability to carry 
out even its basic functions effectively. Our criticism is different. We focus 
on mission creep as a manifestation of a joint problem, portraying the 
phenomenon as a vertical conflict that is the direct consequence of the 
states’ conscious attempt to overcome their horizontal conflicts in the first 
place. 
The EU offers perhaps the most striking example of broad IO missions 
and the ensuing mission creep.141 The EU started off as an institution 
narrowly focused on integrating Western European steel and coal industries. 
It soon moved to establish a customs union and remove internal trade 
barriers. Since then, the competences of the EU have grown to embrace 
issues ranging from environmental and consumer protection to social 
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policy, transport, public health, privacy, and criminal justice. When the EU 
started to pursue more extensive economic liberalization, it tried to obtain 
the cooperation of skeptical member states by balancing its liberal economic 
agenda with extensive social protections. The point of this balancing act was 
to offset any adverse effects of rapid economic integration with adequate 
social protections.142 Therefore, the broad mandate the EU has today 
originated from EU member states’ disagreements on how to balance 
various domestic consumer or environmental protection measures with the 
need to guarantee unrestricted trade within the common market. The easiest 
way to resolve this horizontal conflict was not to make a choice between an 
economic and social Europe—inevitably alienating some member states—
but to expand the EU’s competences to cover both.143 This movement 
toward “an ever-closer union”—an expansion of the EU’s mandate well 
beyond what the U.K. ever intended—was at the heart of the U.K.’s 
discontent with the EU, driving the EU membership referendum, and thus 
leading the U.K. to now abandon the EU altogether.144 
The WTO exhibits a similar evolution, where its trade agenda was 
extended to cover IP back in 1995, with the conclusion of the TRIPS 
agreement.145 The expansion to IP would never have occurred in isolation. 
Instead, it was introduced as part of a “single undertaking” deal across a 
range of policy areas, which was designed to deliver some gains for all 
member states.146 In the case of TRIPS, it was evident that developed 
countries, where the majority of research and development takes place, were 
the beneficiaries of enhanced IP protections, and that developing countries, 
where IP-protected products are mainly consumed or copied, were the 
losers under the agreement.147 Thus, the main challenge in the TRIPS 
negotiations was to overcome this distributional conflict and win the 
support of developing countries. Developing countries were eventually 
brought into the agreement by linking the TRIPS negotiations to 
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concessions in other areas, including agriculture and textiles.148 This 
strategic linkage of unrelated issues contributed to unlocking the horizontal 
conflict and paving the way for a compromise. At the same time, however, 
it empowered the WTO as a multi-issue IO, spurring the call for further 
expansion of the WTO’s mission to include a wide range of trade-related 
issues, including investment, competition, environment, and labor rights. 
The World Bank’s mandate has similarly expanded over time. The Bank 
was created after World War II to provide loans to foster economic 
development, in particular to fund public infrastructure projects.149 In the 
ensuing decades, the Bank adopted a considerably broader view of 
development, seeking to stimulate development via programs as diverse as 
the promotion of literacy, entrepreneurship, labor regulations, gender 
equality, and environmental sustainability.150 While supporters may 
commend the Bank’s accomplishments, critics are quick to condemn its 
foray into more controversial domestic policy areas, and characterize its use 
of conditional lending as oppressive.151 Jessica Einhorn, the former 
Managing Director of the Bank, has described how the Bank took on a large 
number of new issues over time that strayed beyond the IO’s core mission. 
She notes how “the bank takes on challenges that lie far beyond any 
institution’s operational capabilities,” and that “its mission has become so 
complex that it strains credulity to portray the bank as a manageable 
organization.”152 The Bank’s new “unachievable mission” is not surprising, 
given the Bank faces pressure from many different constituencies. She also 
acknowledges the difficulty of reining back the new agendas because every 
new program has created its own constituency that resists change.153 
These examples illustrate a dynamic where vertical conflict stems from 
the states’ deliberate decision to include new issues on the negotiating 
agenda as a way to secure a buy-in of some initially skeptical states. A 
broader mandate may successfully alleviate a horizontal conflict by ensuring 
the IO is vested with the competence to advance something that every key 
stakeholder benefits from. Expanded IO missions can also be desirable 
because they reflect the desire of states to pursue scope economies, where 
various policy issues are closely related and efficiently addressed in 
conjunction with one another. Many supporters of the EU and the WTO, 
for instance, would say these institutions have become successful precisely 
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because of their ability to form linkages and resolve policy conflicts that 
span across multiple issue areas.154 Too narrow IOs with overly constrained 
mandates would not be able to accomplish the same. 
At the same time, vesting the IO with a broad mandate sets the stage 
for a vertical conflict. It facilitates agency slack because an agent with a 
flexible and expansive mission is harder to monitor, and almost impossible 
to rein in as the multiple agendas become entrenched. Principal-agent theory 
suggests that an effective way to constrain an agent is to empower it with a 
clear mission and a tightly constrained mandate to carry out that mission.155 
Therefore, if states and principals were initially concerned about a wayward 
agent, they would delegate only a narrow set of goals for the IO to 
accomplish. A clearly defined set of narrow goals makes it difficult for the 
agent to deviate from its task, and easier for the principals to monitor the 
agent’s performance.156 However, if the IO’s mandate is set with the 
horizontal conflict in mind, states end up with IOs that govern multiple 
issues with broad and hard-to-control mandates, inadvertently exacerbating 
the vertical conflict, just as the theory of joint problem would predict. 
In this Part, we have identified several ways in which solutions to the 
horizontal conflict end up worsening the vertical conflict. We have shown 
how super-majority rules designed to protect the interests of individual 
states make it difficult to reverse decisions by an independent bureaucracy 
or tribunal. In addition, the tendency for each country to place its nationals 
in key IO positions can result in a multi-national bureaucracy, more 
supportive of further international cooperation than any individual national 
priority. Similarly, locating an IO in a remote city reinforces the 
internationalist orientation of the IO staff, and further removes them from 
concerns in national capitals. Finally, linking multiple issues to bring diverse 
states to the negotiating table often results in IOs with broad mandates, and 
their staff become difficult to discipline as a result. While both the vertical 
and the horizontal conflict have been extensively studied in earlier work, 
these connections between the two problems have not been previously 
examined in international law and international relations. To identify some 
possible ways to resolve these conflicts, we now turn to a literature that has 
studied these intersections—corporate law literature. 
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IV. RESOLVING THE JOINT PROBLEM IN OTHER CONTEXTS: IDEAS 
FROM CORPORATE LAW 
We argue above that, in an effort to preempt future conflict, states 
introduce governance measures that end up tying their own hands, thus 
boosting the decision-making leeway of international bodies. The trade-off 
between balanced state influence horizontally, and empowered IO executive 
bodies vertically, has gone largely unnoticed in the literature on international 
law and international relations, which treats these two dimensions as 
distinct. To be sure, leading rational choice theorists recognize that an 
international organization is an agent of its members.157 However, they 
prefer the analytic simplicity of merging all states into a single collective 
principal, rather than the complicated reality of treating each state as a 
separate principal with distinct preferences and ideal points.158 
Constructivist scholars highlight that international bureaucracies, like all 
bureaucracies, take on a distinct identity and may not pursue their goals 
efficiently.159 But constructivist scholars have not yet explored how specific 
balanced governance solutions, which are widespread among IOs, 
eventually worsen the pathologies of international bureaucracies. Nor do 
constructivists argue, as we do, that these rules have origins in the horizontal 
conflicts among states. Unsurprisingly, there have been no serious efforts to 
address the challenges raised by the interaction between horizontal and 
vertical conflicts, either in theoretical literature or on the policy ground. 
In contrast, the dilemmas facing multiple principals, who must choose 
between a powerful and potentially self-serving co-principal on the one 
hand, and an insulated and thus hard-to-control agent on the other, are 
central to corporate law literature. A key goal of corporate law is to pull 
together contributions from multiple investors, thereby gathering the 
resources necessary for the intended business venture.160 In this sense, 
investors are not unlike states that combine efforts to accomplish a mission 
through an IO. And just like states, investors also need reassurance that 
corporate resources will not be diverted to pernicious uses. A particular 
worry for minority shareholders is that a majority shareholder can easily take 
control and run the firm according to her preferences, looting (shared) 
corporate assets in the process.161 Faced with this horizontal conflict, and 
seeking to protect minority shareholders in particular, corporate law 
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insulates the board of directors from the majority and requires it to act for 
the benefit of all shareholders.162 For example, various corporate law 
provisions create hurdles for powerful shareholders seeking to fill the board 
with their representatives. But as many corporate law scholars have 
recognized, empowering the board may lead to managerial abuses.163 
Starting from these realizations, corporate lawyers have engaged in a 
decades-long debate about the optimal level of board independence and 
shareholder control, and explored mechanisms to ameliorate particularly 
challenging situations.164 The shareholder democracy camp points to 
managers’ self-aggrandizing tendencies,165 while the pro-management group 
argues that shareholders cannot fully understand the stakes, and may have 
conflicting interests.166 More recently, Goshen and Squire have underlined 
that the division of control between shareholders and managers is a zero-
sum proposition.167 They note that as shareholders claim ever-greater 
control of the company, they reduce a board’s flexibility to exercise its 
business judgment, which can make the firm worse off if the shareholders 
lack the skills to effectively manage the company.168 By analogizing IO 
member states to shareholders and IO organs to corporate boards, we can 
tap into the extensive literature in corporate law that studies both the 
conflict among shareholders, and the conflict between shareholders and 
managers.169 
The corporate law literature provides three important insights for the 
study of IO delegation. First, when shareholders face greater coordination 
problems, corporate law delegates decision-making power to the board as a 
way of protecting small, passive shareholders from large, active ones.170 
                                               
162 For example, corporate law often casts directors as trustees for shareholders. See Deborah A. 
DeMott, Guests at the Table: Independent Directors in Family-Influenced Public Companies, 33(4) J. CORP. L. 819 
(2008). Jeffrey Gordon also remarks that independent directors can better serve a vision of shareholder 
value maximization tied to stock performance, rather than the goals of insiders. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
163 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 647 (2005). 
164 For an overview of this literature, with a special emphasis on corporate takeovers, see Steven 
M. Davidoff, Takeover Theory and the Law and Economics Movement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill and Brett H. McDonell eds., 2012). 
165 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition 
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440–41 (1992). 
166 See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 1, 42–46 (2002). 
167 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs (2015) (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research 
Paper, Paper No. 14-462). 
168 Id. at 12–13. 
169 See generally John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
35 (Reinier Kraakman ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
170 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 66–67 (1991). Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout view corporate law more generally as a set of rules 
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Because corporations exist in perpetuity, shareholders cannot accurately 
predict or dictate actions necessary for the long-term success of the 
business. As such, the board becomes an attentive, well-informed agent 
tasked with looking after the interests of shareholders. In firms with a 
dispersed shareholder base, the board’s key task is to monitor the firm’s top 
management. But when a populous group of minority shareholders finds 
itself coupled with a controlling shareholder, the board undertakes the 
additional role of protecting the minority from the whims of the controlling 
shareholder. To do so effectively, the board often receives extensive powers 
to oppose the will of the majority shareholder.171 Yet, this leads to the 
second key insight from corporate law: broad powers granted to protect 
minority shareholders can result in entrenching the board. Predictably, 
boards may abuse their powers in order to protect either their own interests 
or the interests of top management. To ensure that, when exercising 
discretion, boards remain focused on promoting the interests of 
shareholders rather than engaging in self-serving behavior, corporate boards 
are subject to fiduciary duties. This broad grant of powers constrained by 
fiduciary duties has many parallels in the delegation of authority by 
sovereign states to international organizations, as has been recognized.172 
Third and finally, corporate law provides a series of suggestions about how 
to ameliorate the joint problem. To preempt harm to minority shareholders, 
corporate law delineates situations where the board is particularly likely to 
face conflicts of interest, and recommends special decision-making 
procedures with higher independence safeguards.173 Moreover, corporate 
law mandates greater transparency and disclosure to shareholders as a way 
of empowering minorities seeking to discipline the board. Below, we 
examine these three insights in turn. 
Some words of caution are necessary before proceeding. We do not 
mean to suggest that IO organs and corporate boards are similar in all ways. 
To start, most corporate boards are free to pursue whatever business goals 
they choose, while IO organs are limited by their treaty mandates. Corporate 
boards’ almost unbridled flexibility suggests that, in certain circumstances, 
the vertical conflict might be more intense. On the other hand, corporate 
boards are single-handedly oriented toward profit-making, while IO organs 
serve a broader set of often public-minded goals. Profit maximization 
                                               
created to facilitate a group of stakeholders to relinquish powers to manage assets to a board, given the 
inherent inability to run a long-term contract. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999). 
171 For example, Delaware law provides a board with the power to oppose a bidder seeking to 
acquire the company by triggering a poison pill, issuing numerous new shares that will dilute the 
bidder’s initial position. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
172 See Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU 
Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 117–118 (2001). 
173 See infra Part III.C. 
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provides a clear yardstick for assessing board performance, while evaluating 
IOs’ actions is not as straightforward. Moreover, some corporations are 
owned by a single shareholder, and yet boards still have a significant role to 
play in supervising the day-to-day running of the corporation. Boards often 
consist of experienced businessmen with superior information about the 
company’s business, and may have better resources to monitor corporate 
activity.174 Yet, despite these differences, corporate law envisages boards as 
especially useful when multiple shareholders come together, providing a 
governance structure that brings together individuals with different goals 
and time horizons.175 In this respect, corporate boards and IO organs are 
quite similar. This is where our thought experiment begins. 
A. Greater Shareholder Coordination Costs Increase Delegation of Powers to 
Boards 
Delegation of decision-making powers to the board of directors, a key 
feature of corporate law, prevents shareholders from directly proposing and 
implementing business choices.176 Since the nineteenth century, courts have 
ruled that boards should not submit to the will of a shareholder, even if the 
shareholder controls the majority of the company’s share capital.177 Rather, 
boards should act as representatives of all shareholders, thinking of the 
aggregate interests of the corporation rather than the desires of the majority. 
Thus, corporate law seeks to neutralize the outsized influence of a majority 
shareholder when the shareholder’s preferred course would harm the 
interests of the corporation, namely the interests of the other shareholders. 
Due to board autonomy, shareholders seeking to shape the 
corporation’s business must find indirect ways of influencing the board. 
Generally, corporate law provides shareholders with two channels of input: 
the process of electing and removing board members,178 and through special 
rights to approve fundamental transactions, such as mergers179 or charter 
amendments.180 However, the extent to which these channels are open to 
shareholders depends largely on the underlying ownership patterns of the 
                                               
174 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 791 (2002). 
175 Id. 
176 Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: The 
Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55, 72–75 (Reinier Kraakman ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
177 See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 
(Eng.). 
178 Delaware law requires a shareholder vote for electing directors, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 
(2011), and allows a shareholder majority to remove directors without cause; but cause is required if 
the board is staggered, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011). 
179 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011). 
180 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2016). 
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corporation, and the resulting costs of coordination. While adhering to the 
principle of majority voting, corporate law also introduces mechanisms 
intended to constrain powerful shareholders from steering the corporation 
in their preferred direction, as the discussion below illustrates. These 
mechanisms are typically justified as measures to protect the inherent value 
of the corporation for all shareholders, minority shareholders especially. 
Rules for the election and appointment of corporate directors prevent 
powerful shareholders from dominating the board, particularly if they fall 
short of a shareholder majority. To start, the board itself nominates 
candidates for board positions through its proxy materials.181 A shareholder 
block, typically 1–3%, can use the company’s proxy to nominate candidates, 
if allowed by the charter, but they still have to run against the boards’ 
nominees.182 In many cases, significant shareholders are content with 
electing one representative, stopping far short of control. Shareholders may 
be better able to influence board members if they can not only appoint them, 
but also threaten to remove them before their tenure expires. In most 
jurisdictions, including Delaware, only a majority of shareholders has the 
right to remove directors at will.183 But even then, Delaware allows for an 
important exception from at-will removal of directors by permitting a 
staggered board. When a board is staggered, with different classes of 
directors having their tenure expire at different intervals, a shareholder 
majority can remove directors only for cause.184 This substantial inroad into 
shareholder powers is typically justified as a mechanism to promote 
investment in projects that can produce superior long-term results. 
However, in the short run, inability to discipline the board can drag the stock 
price down.185 In practice, a staggered board can delay even a majority 
shareholder from taking full control of the corporation for several years. 
Takeovers represent a particularly precarious moment for shareholders, 
and can be fraught with horizontal conflicts.186 Bidders typically propose a 
                                               
181 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c) (2011). 
182 A federal rule to that effect was adopted by the SEC and then struck down, but some 
corporations amend their charters to achieve the same result. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott 
Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. L. 329 (2010) (arguing that this should be a 
default rule, rather than an opt-in rule in corporate law). 
183 Enriques, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 176, at 64–66. In some jurisdictions, there are 
exceptions for board members appointed to represent specific constituencies, such as labor 
representatives in Germany. 
184 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011). 
185 See generally Stephen P. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1735 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010). 
186 For an overview of takeover deal making, see generally STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT 
WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 
(2010) (exploring how legal intricacies affect takeover strategies on the ground). 
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premium over market price in return for gaining control of the company.187 
Sometimes, bidders already have significant amounts of the company’s 
stock, and may even own a majority. Or, some shareholders may be 
motivated to sell, while others may prefer to wait until the company’s 
strategy bears fruit. In any event, corporate law requires boards to step in 
and assess the offer.188 If a board decides the offer is inadequate, it has broad 
powers to avert a takeover bid, even if a shareholder majority wishes 
otherwise.189 Delaware takeover jurisprudence allows the board to utilize 
corporate assets to promise alternative pay-outs to shareholders, so as to 
fend off takeover attempts.190 Boards can also utilize poison pills, which 
involve issuing stock or some other assembly of corporate assets to all 
shareholders except the acquirer, which dilutes the acquirer’s existing equity 
stake in the target and forces it to speak directly to the board.191 With such 
extensive delegated powers, Delaware law envisions the board as a well-
informed decision-maker devised to intervene and protect minorities against 
a shareholder majority that finds itself in the wrong. 
B. Broad Powers Granted to Protect Shareholders Can Entrench the Board 
In the conventional account of corporate law, as discussed above, the 
vertical delegation of powers to the corporate board addresses concerns 
about potential horizontal conflicts among shareholders. Not only does a 
powerful board represent a nimble management structure, but it also 
ensures shareholders, especially minorities, that their investments will not 
fall prey to incompetent managers or whimsical majorities.192 Yet, as 
corporate law scholars have emphasized, neutralizing the influence of 
powerful shareholders on the board comes at the cost of blunting the 
traditional mechanisms of disciplining the board.193 A board insulated from 
pressures to yield to shareholders can also develop and pursue its own 
agenda, regardless of whether that agenda is consistent with shareholder 
aspirations.194 As a result, the board can either shirk its fundamental duties 
to shareholders, or appropriate for itself benefits belonging to shareholders. 
Thus, the very mechanisms designed to check shareholders’ power vis-à-vis 
other shareholders have the inadvertent effect of permitting a board to 
abuse its powers. 
                                               
187 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and 
Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1235 (1990). 
188 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
189 See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
190 Id. 
191 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
192 See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984). 
193 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 814–15 (2001). 
194 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
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An extensive literature in corporate law focuses on the vertical conflict 
between shareholders and managers.195 It argues that entrenched boards are 
prone to managerial abuses and likely to choose strategies that serve their 
own interests instead of those of shareholders. Boards, for example, may 
approve expensive acquisitions to expand their influence,196 they may pay 
themselves and their managers more, even when it is not justified by 
corporate performance,197 or they may retain excessive funds in the 
corporation, rather than distribute dividends to shareholders.198 Prominent 
corporate law scholars sensitive to these abuses argue for increasing 
shareholder power over boards. They find support in many leading 
economists, who claim companies with more accountable governance 
structures tend to perform better in the long term.199 They also found that 
governance arrangements that entrench boards, such as staggering, were 
associated with lower valuations.200 This camp has made headway in recent 
years through shareholder activists, typically hedge funds run by famous 
investors like Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman,201 who typically demand reforms 
that increase shareholder influence, such as de-staggering boards.202 
Regardless of whether one supports or opposes board entrenchment, 
one thing is clear: both groups see the interplay between horizontal and 
vertical conflict as a trade-off. When concerns arise over a powerful 
shareholder abusing its influence over a corporation, broadening the 
delegation of decision-making powers to a third body seems a plausible 
solution. Yet, the more independent this third party becomes, the more 
likely it will be to advance its own goals over those of its principals. Aware 
of this trade-off, more corporations choose a different mix of board powers 
and shareholder influence mechanisms. Some provide the board with 
                                               
195 The seminal contribution that began this conversation conceptualized the board as an agent 
of the shareholders, and explored the associated agency costs. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976). 
196 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1967); Yakov Amihud 
& Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981); 
Dennis C. Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1969). 
197 See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that managers have been 
able to increase their pay without justification because corporate law does not facilitate effective 
shareholder supervision). 
198 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific 
Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1989). 
199 See generally Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
200 Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force 
of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002); but see Martjin Cremers & 
Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 837 (2016). 
201 See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge 
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011). 
202 See, e.g., Carl Icahn, Corporate Boards That Do Their Job, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501256.html. 
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significant leeway, so talented management can pursue its strategies 
unencumbered, like Apple in the Steve Jobs era.203 Others adopt devices to 
ensure control stays with powerful shareholders, such as the dual class 
structure of Google and the New York Times.204 As Goshen and Squire 
argue, there is a continuum between complete shareholder control and 
absolute management discretion,205 and corporations make different choices 
based on their industry, their needs, and human talent available to them. 
C. Lessons for International Law: Ways to Ameliorate the Unintended 
Consequences of Horizontal and Vertical Interaction 
The debate over the intersection of horizontal and vertical conflicts in 
corporations persists in law reviews, courtrooms, and legislative chambers. 
While generally upholding the governance choices reflected in corporate 
charters, courts have intervened when they see an especially grave clash 
between horizontal and vertical interests.206 For these instances, courts have 
promulgated doctrines to help protect minority shareholders, who otherwise 
risk being outflanked by majorities or managers. Legislatures have also 
established special rules for corporations with publicly traded stock, which 
protect retail investors who are too small and numerous to actively engage 
in management. These corporate law remedies, we believe, offer guidance 
on how to address similar clashes in IOs. Some of the above-mentioned 
solutions are merely recommended best practices, while others are 
mandatory law. Regardless, if some of the solutions were adopted 
voluntarily, they could still improve the position of minorities. 
One strategy that has proven particularly useful to small shareholders is 
disclosure of corporate affairs. Indeed, international organizations have 
responded to calls for greater transparency in recent years by increasing 
circulation of annual reports, memoranda, and other materials. However, 
corporate disclosure goes farther than these practices. In corporate law, 
disclosure documents are reviewed and amended by third parties, including 
lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers. Collectively called 
gatekeepers, these professionals stake their reputation on providing the 
most accurate account of company affairs as possible, and can face liability 
if their due diligence is insufficient. Although far from perfect, this system 
at least ensures managers are not in absolute control of the information 
                                               
203 See Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Understanding the Board of Directors After the 
Financial Crisis: Some Lessons for Europe, 41 J. L. & SOC’Y 121, 127–29 (2014). 
204 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars to Have Less of a Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/shareholders-
vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html?_r=0.  
205 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 167. 
206 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial 
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989). 
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released. Moreover, corporate disclosure is addressed to shareholders (i.e., 
owners of the corporation), whose support is vital for management. For 
these reasons, corporate disclosures are not mere marketing materials. 
Rather, they describe both the achievements and hardships facing the 
corporation at a given moment. Lastly, corporate disclosures are updated at 
regular intervals, thus keeping the flow of information ongoing. 
Corporate law regards mandatory disclosure as a regulatory technique 
that serves primarily small shareholders, protecting them against both 
overreaching majorities and self-serving agents.207 Disclosure requirements 
can both force managers to submit their actions to scrutiny, and serve as a 
check on powerful shareholders who want to exert influence behind the 
scenes.208 Moreover, disclosure of problems makes correction of course 
easier and more immediate. While these functions are useful to all 
shareholders, they are particularly valuable to small ones, who otherwise lack 
the resources and expertise to delve into corporate affairs.209 Through 
disclosure requirements, minority shareholders offload part of the costs of 
supervising the corporation on to those who possess the information 
already, i.e., managers and majority shareholders. In other words, a small 
shareholder lacks the capacity to supervise every corporation she could own 
stocks in. As such, mandatory disclosure enables small shareholders to 
carefully assess company data, rather than collect it.  
Disclosure, of course, is not without costs. The management team must 
spend considerable time and effort gathering information and drafting the 
disclosure. Moreover, corporate disclosures may help competitors by 
revealing the company’s strategies or plans. To avoid overburdening the 
corporation, federal law only requires disclosure of events material to the 
company’s financial position.210 Traditionally, events were material if their 
impact on the corporation’s annual revenues exceeded a 5% threshold.211 In 
recent years, courts and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
moved to a more nuanced approach that combines quantitative and 
qualitative considerations.212 Under this approach, corporations need not 
reveal every detail of their business. Rather, they must only provide 
sufficient information for an outsider to understand the company’s major 
goals, strategies, strengths, and weaknesses. 
                                               
207 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (arguing that the public interest justification for securities laws 
survives the public choice critique). 
208 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1047 (1995). 
209 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 717, 738 (1984). 
210 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
211 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999). 
212 Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333187 
2018] UNINTENDED AGENCY PROBLEMS  207 
Just like small shareholders, less powerful states face dynamics that limit 
their ability to effectively look after their interests in many IOs. Often, 
smaller states seek to join forces and achieve some level of representation 
for their region, if not for each state individually. For example, the Group 
of 77 (G-77) has been lobbying for Brazil to get a seat on the Security 
Council.213 This effort rests on two assumptions: that Brazil will devote the 
resources necessary to do all the information gathering and analysis, and 
that, once it does, its interests will be in line with the remaining G-77. Either 
of these assumptions, or both, may prove wrong as different issues reach 
the IO. Instead, we argue, smaller countries would be better served by 
getting more disclosure from IO secretariats and courts. With more 
disclosure, smaller states could examine the contours of the IOs’ decisions 
themselves, and form their own alliances on each matter. Moreover, it could 
empower a broad range of actors, such as multiple states and civil society 
organizations, to monitor the IOs and call for intervention when necessary. 
In this way, disclosures will serve as a check on IO decision-making similar 
to the requirement to provide a reasoned justification for rulemaking in 
domestic administrative procedures.214 A decision’s importance in the 
overall IO scheme could determine whether it needs to be disclosed or not, 
so that IO staff are not flooded with requests, and so that important issues 
are flagged for small country missions. 
While disclosure could help small shareholders monitor corporate 
affairs and deter wrongdoing during the firm’s ordinary course of business, 
there are circumstances where small shareholders may need even greater 
assistance and protection. Specifically, when a proposed business move 
might benefit both the corporation and the controlling shareholder or the 
manager, it is hard to distinguish ex ante whether a fiduciary duty issue has 
arisen. For example, the corporation may look into buying a piece of 
property that belongs to a major shareholder on favorable terms. Depending 
on the pricing, the transaction may be entirely fair, but may also prove 
burdensome or unfair to shareholders. If corporate law prohibited such a 
transaction entirely, it could deprive the corporation from a potentially 
lucrative business opportunity. After all, the shareholder’s property could be 
particularly appealing. 
Instead, corporate law provides a separate governance approach for 
assessing deals where the corporate entity and key shareholders are 
counterparties, relying on two mechanisms.215 The first mechanism consists 
of the appointment of independent board members tasked with negotiating 
                                               
213 See, e.g., Marcello M. Valenca & Gustavo Carvalho, Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: The Shifting Role 
of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy, 8 BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 66 (2014). 
214 See Majone, supra note 53, at 118. 
215 These mechanisms were recommended by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
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with the majority shareholder at arm’s length.216 This mechanism serves to 
prevent key shareholders from placing undue pressure on the board. But 
since such pressures cannot be fully prevented ex ante, the second procedural 
mechanism offers an additional safeguard. Under Delaware jurisprudence, 
the conflicted shareholder must abstain from any vote about her transaction 
with the corporation. Thus, the proposed transaction must win the support 
of a majority of minority shareholders in order to shed any taint of a conflict 
of interest. 217 
IOs often face situations where a proposed move is arguably beneficial 
to the IO as a whole, but disproportionately beneficial to certain powerful 
states actively supporting it. For example, IMF lending is sometimes severely 
criticized for serving the interests of key lender states, at the expense of the 
IMF’s shared goals.218 While all IMF members have a shared interest in 
maintaining global financial stability, in part by lending only to states that 
can ultimately repay their loans, individual IMF members might want the 
IMF to extend outsize loans to even insolvent states, which protects their 
private banks’ investments.219 For example, the IMF’s decision to lend forty-
eight billion dollars to Greece at a moment when many, including IMF 
staffers, considered it insolvent, has been widely criticized by large emerging 
states like Brazil.220 While a large IMF loan to Greece may have prevented a 
global financial crisis, it certainly benefited — first and foremost — French 
and German commercial banks with extensive exposure to Greek sovereign 
debt.221 The decision to have a former French minister — now head of the 
IMF — adjudicate the pros and cons of the unusual loan did not appear 
neutral to many smaller IMF shareholders.222 Indeed, in the midst of the 
Greek crisis, Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa created their own 
competing bank to ensure that a handful of developed countries did not 
                                               
216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)–(3) (2011). In interpreting this provision, Delaware courts 
have considered whether the board comprises an adequate number of independent members, or 
whether a committee of independent board members has been appointed. See, e.g., In re Trados, 73 
A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
217 In re Trados, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
218 Lesley Wroughton, Howard Schneider & Dina Kyriakidou, How the IMF’s Misadventure in 
Greece is Changing the Fund, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/imf- greece/. 
219 See Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 53; J. Lawrence Broz & Michael Brewster Hawes, Congressional 
Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund, 60 INT’L ORG. 367 (2006); J. Lawrence Broz, 
Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 479 (2005); Thomas Oatley & 
Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415, 415–17 (2004). 
220 Philip Aldrick, UK Businesses Demand Return of Powers from Brussels, TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2013), 
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control all major lending decisions by putting undue pressure on IMF 
staffers.223 
Corporate law may lend some guidance on how to make critical 
decisions, such as whether and how to lend to Greece, in a less fraught 
manner. To start, the above-mentioned doctrines help identify which IO 
decisions might call for separate decision-making procedures. Notably, it is 
not the size of a particular deal that triggers special rules, but rather the fact 
that a major shareholder also stands to benefit in another capacity (e.g., as a 
counterparty). To take the IMF example above, if the IMF were thinking of 
extending a loan of unprecedented size to Thailand, and Thai debt was 
primarily owned by Thai banks, ordinary IMF lending procedures should 
apply. In contrast, after identifying benefits to major shareholders, the IO 
can put in place a special procedure along the lines suggested above. It could 
require independent experts to evaluate and negotiate the proposal, such as 
the extension of credit to a country in hardship, in the IMF’s case. Once 
finalized, it could require the proposal to win the approval of a majority of 
the IO’s board, excluding the powerful states that stand to directly benefit 
from it. If a proposal goes through third-party scrutiny and gains the support 
of members focused on the IO’s mission, rather than just side gains, it can 
enjoy increased acceptance and legitimacy internationally. 
Our proposal for increased disclosure and special governance rules can 
help alleviate the clash between horizontal and vertical conflicts in IOs. 
Disclosure helps redistribute the costs of IO supervision among member-
states, while special governance rules inject a specialized vertical agent with 
higher independence safeguards in the most critical moments. We do not 
believe these techniques are infallible, but we do think they offer alternative 
approaches that are considerably better than current IO governance choices. 
Especially if adopted ex ante, our proposal can help ease the dilemmas many 
states face when considering joining an IO. 
V. WHEN IS THE JOINT PROBLEM MOST ACUTE? 
The discussion below seeks to identify when the joint problem is 
particularly pertinent. It also explores which states have the most to lose and 
gain from the emergence and persistence of the joint problem. We expect 
the distributional consequences and intensity of the joint problem to vary 
with certain state characteristics and features of the IO itself. We argue that 
small states have the most to gain, and large states the most to lose, from 
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the joint problem. We also discuss how the joint problem is likely more 
severe in old, established IOs, and less challenging in young IOs. The size 
of the IO is relevant as well, as we observe the joint problem as more acute 
in large organizations than small ones. Finally, we predict that the more 
divided the member states’ interests are, the more persistent the joint 
problem becomes. 
A. Small vs. Large States 
We assume large states will find the joint problem especially costly and 
troubling, while small states will likely benefit from it. In a purely political, 
horizontal negotiation, without an IO, small states tend to lose to large 
states. Centralized IOs are likely to constrain the power of large states, and 
small countries may come to benefit from delegation to institutions that 
trend toward advancing the collective preferences of member states. In 
other words, small countries expect to lose most horizontal conflicts to large 
states, while vertical conflicts may enhance their relative standing vis-à-vis 
large states. 
This pattern should manifest differently at different points in time. 
When setting up an IO—insofar as states anticipate the vertical problem at 
this stage—we expect large states to prefer to grant more limited powers to 
the IO, and small states to advocate for more extensive powers for the IO. 
That said, large states may agree to delegate broader powers to a nascent IO 
as a way to obtain small-state participation. Just as large shareholders often 
accept an independent board to attract small shareholders and assure them 
that their money will be safe, large countries may offer an independent 
tribunal as a way to entice small-state participation. However, once the 
organization is in place, we expect independent IO organs to make decisions 
that are more favorable to small states, relative to decisions made by IO 
bodies dominated by inter-governmental bargaining. 
To illustrate, we can look at the institutional designs of the WTO and 
the EU. Before the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, developing countries were wary of unilateral U.S. retaliation in 
trade conflicts. For example, in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to 
the creation of a binding dispute settlement mechanism and permanent 
WTO Appellate Body, weaker parties saw the empowered judicial arm of 
the WTO as a welcome protection against U.S. unilateralism.224 At that time, 
and in hindsight, these weak states were likely less concerned about planting 
the seeds for a vertical conflict. Presumably, weak states knew the WTO 
could rule against them as well. However, delegation to a neutral agent in 
Geneva made the trading system better for them relative to the earlier 
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situation, which was characterized by horizontal conflicts with more 
powerful trading partners who almost always prevailed. Now, critics would 
note the ability of powerful states to take advantage of WTO dispute 
settlement, due to the financial resources and technical expertise that 
complex trade dispute litigation entails. However, there are examples of 
important victories small states have secured against their powerful trading 
partners before the WTO judiciary: Antigua’s (population of 90,000) victory 
over the U.S. in a high-stakes gambling case under the GATS agreement in 
2005 is perhaps the most prominent (though certainly not the lone) 
example.225 
Similarly, small EU states often find European institutions to be their 
most helpful allies. Relative to large EU member states, small states are less 
worried about the European Commission occasionally overstepping its 
mandate. Moreover, even if it did, at least the commissioner from Malta or 
Luxembourg, for example, has as many votes as the German commissioner 
in deciding where to take the European project. The Commission and the 
ECB have also been perceived as Greece’s staunchest allies in the Euro 
crises, defending the integrity of the Eurozone and standing up against the 
most powerful member state, Germany, in order to keep the Eurozone 
whole.226 Similarly, empirical studies on European Court of Justice case law 
show larger states lost more frequently before the ECJ than small states. In 
particular, Germany lost more often than any other state.227 
B. Young vs. Old IOs 
As the continuing battles among states within the UN Security Council 
and the World Health Assembly show, horizontal conflicts never entirely 
disappear from IO governance. However, recently established IOs, we 
argue, typically experience less severe vertical conflicts. The powers IOs 
acquire through delegation typically become entrenched over time. So, 
delegation may initially seem efficient, as the costs of horizontal conflict can 
be contained with delegation—without experiencing a simple substitution 
with vertical costs—but vertical costs gradually start to rise. 
When vertical costs start to emerge, why do states not roll back some 
of the powers delegated to IOs? Quite simply, initial delegation is difficult 
                                               
225 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Borderf Supply of Gambling and 
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to reverse. This is a well-documented phenomenon.228 IOs do not rest on 
nimble and flexible bargains that can be easily renegotiated when vertical 
conflict deepens. Institutional arrangements are often remarkably persistent, 
as the theory of path dependence suggests.229 Moreover, the difficulty of 
renegotiation is not the only challenge—individual state exits are also rare 
in most IOs. This contrasts the corporate context, where one can exit by 
simply selling one’s shares. For example, no member state has ever 
withdrawn from the EU. Despite all the crises and struggles the EU has 
experienced, together with the surge of various anti-EU sentiments and 
parties at various points in history, the EU has remained whole and 
remarkably resilient. The rare exception is Greenland—which holds 
semiautonomous status as part of Denmark—which departed from the 
European Economic Community (the EU’s predecessor) in 1985.230 This is 
why the U.K.’s decision this year to exit from the EU is all the more striking. 
Other IOs exhibit a similar stickiness. NATO membership has 
expanded in the decades since its creation with only rare—and even then, 
only temporary—exits. France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
command structures in 1966, only to resume its full membership in 2009.231 
Similarly, Greece briefly withdrew from NATO in 1974, but re-joined in 
1980.232 No member has left the WTO to date.233 Venezuela has denounced 
the American Convention in order to escape the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court,234 but perhaps this shows just how far an independent 
court can deviate from member-state preferences before an exit occurs. 
These examples show how engrained initial arrangements become, 
allowing for agendas and institutional cultures to develop and become 
entrenched over time. Accordingly, the joint problem is often a dynamic 
concept in which the IO initially responds to its creators’ preferences and 
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allows them to pursue collective gains. Over time, however, IOs trend 
toward overshadowing or replacing their creators’ agendas with their own. 
C. Small vs. Large IOs 
We expect the joint problem to be more common in large IOs. IOs 
range from universal IOs to small IOs with a closed membership. Universal 
IOs are common in areas where an IO is created to provide global public 
goods. In these instances, every state’s participation is desirable to avoid free 
riding. In contrast, small IOs often reflect states’ desire to produce “club 
goods” for a smaller number of states, which agree to undertake certain 
obligations in return for certain benefits that can be limited to the members 
of the IO. Small IOs often consist of relatively similar states that share 
political values, exhibit comparable economic features, or are geographically 
close. These features allow them to agree on deeper cooperation. 
The UN has always relied on the appeal of universal membership as a 
foundation of an international system consisting of equal, sovereign 
states.235 Its pursuit of peace and security, as well as higher levels of global 
development, are considered global public goods, meant to benefit all states. 
The Group of 20 (G-20), by definition, is designed to be a club of the twenty 
wealthiest states, who see themselves as having special responsibilities (and 
privileges) stemming from their economic and political influence in the 
world.236 Similarly, OECD membership is reserved for developed countries 
exhibiting certain minimum levels of industrialization and GDP, and thus 
sharing a common interest in certain economic policies.237 To take another 
example, EU membership is based on geographic location and commitment 
to values that all EU members must embrace. 
Large IOs are generally more vulnerable to the joint problem because 
of greater heterogeneity, which grows with increased membership. We 
therefore expect the design features of large, heterogeneous IOs to reflect a 
response to a particularly severe horizontal conflict. This might lead such 
states to delegate little power to IOs. However, if delegation occurs, our 
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prediction is that the vertical conflict will ultimately become very large. For 
example, just as super-majority rules prevent the delegation of sensitive 
issues to an IO’s secretariat, they also prevent censuring of a wayward IO if 
delegation does in fact happen. This more prevalent horizontal conflict leads 
states to feel what we believe is at the heart of the joint problem: deep 
mistrust. Deep mistrust leads states to implement voting rules protecting 
them from the overreach of their partners, and to make staffing and location 
decisions that lay the foundation for joint problems to emerge. 
Consider the UN, which today has 193 members.238 Large organizations 
require large secretariats: the UN’s global secretariat consists of 44,000 
employees.239 A secretariat of this size, combined with its deep collective 
international experience and outlook, allows a deeper institutional culture to 
develop, and for the power and prestige associated with a high position at 
the UN to become more penetrating. 
We also assume the joint problem to be worse when an IO is located 
far from the capitals of the great powers that created it. While the UN would 
seem to be a bad example, since its headquarters is in New York, the 
expansion of the UN has in fact entailed a substantial move toward 
governance through field offices scattered across the globe.240 Today, 60% 
of UN staff works outside its headquarters.241 This transformation of the 
UN into a multifaceted agency complicates the monitoring task of principal 
states, further entrenching the vertical conflict.  
The joint problem being more entrenched in large IOs is compounded 
by the tendency of IOs to grow over time. For example, the six-member 
European Coal and Steel Community, founded in 1952, has evolved into 
the twenty-eight-member EU today.242 The WTO has grown from twenty-
three General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members in 1947 
to 162 WTO members to date.243 NATO had twelve members in 1949, but 
has twenty-eight members today.244 We argue above that the joint problem 
is worse in old versus new IOs. As such, growing age and IO size tend to 
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positively correlate: the larger IOs are also typically more mature. In this 
setting, we argue, the joint problem is almost guaranteed to emerge. 
D. Harmonious vs. Divided State Interests 
Directly above, we argued that horizontal conflict is typically greater in 
large IOs because the size of the IO typically correlates with greater 
heterogeneity. However, a rejoinder to this argument is that size is not 
directly relevant. Alternatively, one may argue that a better proxy for likely 
emergence of the joint problem is the degree of disagreement among the 
most powerful member states. Per this argument, the number of players and 
their preferences may hardly matter in some IOs. 
Mark Copelovitch documents a related point in his work on the IMF 
that we briefly discussed above. He suggests the IMF staff can better 
aggrandize its power—by pursuing bigger loans with more conditions—
when the five principal IMF lending countries are divided in their 
preferences.245 The EU literature could be read in a similar vein—the biggest 
and most controversial ECJ decisions were made in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
period during which member states were sharply divided on economic 
policy and whether economic protectionism or liberalization should be 
pursued.246 In other words, we expect the joint problem to emerge and 
prevail in settings where key players fail to agree on the powers of the agent 




To summarize, we present some scope conditions for our argument. We 
argue that the joint problem is most acute for long-established, large IOs 
with heterogeneous membership. We also discuss how the joint problem 
might trouble large countries more than small ones, because in the absence 
of an IO, large states’ interests carry the day. In the next part, we conclude 
by outlining ways to mitigate the joint problem. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
This Article has identified a major tension IOs face as they grow and 
expand. When IOs are first established, negotiators are primarily concerned 
with state-to-state disagreements (horizontal conflicts). States therefore 
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design IOs with features that protect them from other states overreaching 
and shirking. However, as IOs mature, and separate secretariats and courts 
acquire power, clashes between states collectively on the one hand, and IOs 
on the other, begin to emerge (vertical conflicts). We have argued that 
governance arrangements initially put in place to mitigate the pernicious 
influence of individual states end up constraining the collective ability of 
states to steer IOs in their desired direction later on. Thus, states’ attempts 
to mitigate one problem inadvertently cause another. 
To illustrate this dynamic, we have focused on specific governance 
arrangements that are common to many IOs. For example, many IOs 
operate on the basis of consensus. However, the need to achieve consensus 
makes it hard to revisit a prior decision, which strengthens the position of 
IOs established in their wake. Similarly, all member states seek to place some 
of their nationals in key IO positions. But, as people from many countries 
staff international courts and bureaucracies, they develop cosmopolitan 
perspectives and grow more supportive of exercising power at a supra-
national level. Moreover, new IOs are often headquartered in locations 
removed from powerful national capitals, such as Brussels, Luxembourg, 
Geneva, and The Hague. This built-in isolation cultivates an international 
mind-set that fosters corresponding loyalties, removing international civil 
servants from the key concerns of national governments. To demonstrate 
this, we have drawn examples from prominent international bodies, 
including the European Union, the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Finally, states often create IOs with 
broad mandates in an effort to include each individual state’s top priorities, 
and to make sure these issues are linked, so that as many states as possible 
can participate. However, later on, it becomes challenging to constrain IOs 
with broad mandates. 
The root of the joint problem for IOs is structural, since any IO with 
an organized bureaucracy is bound to face both vertical and horizontal 
conflicts. We have suggested the joint problem is here to stay, since 
retreating from the features that initially created the joint problem is rarely 
possible. We do not expect states to radically reform IO’s voting rules, 
repatriate the internationally-minded bureaucracy, relocate the headquarters, 
or streamline the multi-issue agendas in favor of narrow mandates. Less 
radical reforms—through budget reallocations or resolutions that change 
the ways IO operate in specific areas—happen a lot more frequently, but 
these rarely suffice to solve the problem we have identified. Although this 
quandary is inescapable, its full implications have often taken states and 
other stakeholders by surprise. In this last section, we begin to outline those 
implications, focusing on the options available to states at the point when 
the joint problem becomes unmistakable, and solutions to it unattainable. 
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To start, our analysis suggests that reforming an IO can be infeasible. 
Attempts to change the composition of the UN Security Council is perhaps 
the most well-known example of everyone agreeing on the need for a 
reform, but where none of the existing veto-holding members are willing to 
give away the power given to them following World War II.247 That being 
said, reform is often impossible even when the stakes are lower. Any effort 
to revisit an IO’s constitutive charters would call for a new negotiation 
process, which would need to involve all members and open up painfully 
reached compromises. In addition, renegotiations would face resistance 
from entrenched interests benefiting from the status quo. This is because 
the IO staff has operationalized the IO’s mission in particular ways, creating 
expectations for stakeholders on the ground. These established practices 
and precedents are hard to overturn. Moreover, the staff may have 
developed its own set of values that diverge from the preferences of their 
reformers. Against these dynamics, achieving reform may be either 
improbable or highly costly. 
The stickiness of IOs has led states to explore alternative solutions with 
an increased urgency. Exit from the IO might be one such solution for an 
aggrieved state. The U.K., for example, has initiated the formal process of 
leaving the European Union, after U.K.’s former Prime Minister Cameron 
failed to convince U.K. voters that reforming the bureaucracy in Brussels 
was possible.248 The many existing beneficiaries of European integration, 
including the U.K. business community, oppose the exit, making exit a 
costly option for the U.K. domestically.249 European institutions and U.K.’s 
key European partners similarly resist the idea,250 making it unlikely they 
would replace the U.K.’s EU membership with a set of specially negotiated 
agreements that restore the U.K.’s access to the common market. Greece 
has also been on the verge of exit from key European institutions. At the 
height of the Greek sovereign crisis, the newly elected radical-left 
government in Greece was contemplating abandoning the Eurozone 
overnight.251 This literally would have required a heist at their central bank’s 
vaults, since the Greek government faced the opposition of a forceful ECB-
approved central banker, shielded under the safeguards of independence 
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established in the Eurozone treaties.252 For all the talk and almost-cinematic 
appeal of reasserting national sovereignty, the exit option cannot fail to mask 
its profound consequences. Exiting states risk losing all the benefits of 
cooperation, and alienating its hitherto partners. 
Given the difficulty of reform and sky-high costs of exit, neither staying 
nor leaving the IO seems to offer a tenable solution to unhappy members. 
States may therefore begin looking for ways to sidestep the challenges of the 
joint problem. This strategy may allow them to continue to reap benefits 
from institutionalized cooperation, but also to adjust the terms of doing so 
without the constraints of existing, entrenched arrangements. One such 
approach calls for creating new IOs to operate alongside, and often in 
competition with, pre-existing ones. A new IO can overcome horizontal 
conflicts among members, typical of existing IOs, by gathering only like-
minded states that are united in their goals and vision for the organization. 
Moreover, a new IO requires new staff, and thus does away with the cultural 
norms and long-established beliefs often underlying vertical conflicts. For 
example, the BRICS governments, disgruntled with the IMF’s failure to 
implement governance reforms providing a stronger voice to emerging 
economies, launched an alternative global lender, the New Development 
Bank, in 2014.253 In other cases, states turn to regional solutions that operate 
on the sidelines of formal IOs. The shift to regionalism in international trade 
liberalization, with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated alongside WTO, 
betray a frustration with WTO reform.254 Whatever the merits of a 
competing IO at the time of its creation, it does not guarantee increased 
cooperation and stability. Our theory predicts that new IOs will inevitably 
face their own horizontal and vertical challenges, which will only grow with 
time. 
Rather than generating an ever-higher number of formal IOs, states 
often choose to eschew the IO format altogether. Instead, cooperation takes 
place through transnational networks, centered on regular meetings among 
national officials responsible for a certain issue area. For example, instead 
of expanding the WTO’s mandate with respect to international antitrust 
regulation, as several states suggested, antitrust regulators across the world 
formed an International Competition Network to facilitate cooperation 
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among them.255 Transnational networks have also become commonplace in 
international financial regulation.256 While IOs are distinct legal entities with 
delegated powers separate from national policymakers, networks allow state 
authorities to participate directly in global dialogue. If they happen to 
disagree with the dialogue’s outcome, governments have no legal obligation 
to adopt the network’s recommended actions, and may choose to comply 
only in part.257 Thus, when differences of opinion among network members 
arise, tensions need not be as high. Moreover, networks rely on national 
authorities to devote personnel time for their various committees, regulatory 
proposals, and implementation reviews. Without an extensive staff of their 
own, networks are less likely to develop sclerotic bureaucracies with distinct 
identities. By lowering the stakes in horizontal conflicts, and leaving vertical 
implementation to their members, networks offer a viable alternative to 
states and national authorities. On the other hand, networks lack an 
administrative arm with power to enforce their policies on the ground. That 
said, these two limitations also characterize much IO activity. While 
reputational concerns and peer pressure can encourage compliance, 
particularly when accompanied by review programs, differences in speed, 
intensity, and interpretation are highly likely. In other words, while the joint 
problem may be mitigated, the benefits of cooperation are reduced as well. 
The all-too-frequent calls for reforming IOs, exiting from IOs, the 
creation of competing IOs, and the proliferation of networks, have 
dominated the global scene in recent years. While prior literature has studied 
these four phenomena separately, our analytical framework underlines what 
they have in common. As the discussion above showed, while all approaches 
seek to address an IO’s joint problem, they also entail significant 
compromises for the member states involved, as well as a significant loss of 
influence for any existing IO. Thus, we also used our analytical framework 
to explore governance strategies that IOs can introduce in order to address 
the joint problem from the inside and contain member state dissatisfaction. 
We drew our inspiration from approaches shaped in corporate law, 
which has helped us sketch out the interaction between horizontal and 
vertical conflicts. In particular, we focused on two techniques that corporate 
law has used extensively: the use of disclosure to empower shareholders 
against management, and the role of independent committees to manage 
conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders on the one hand, 
and top management and controlling shareholders on the other. Neither 
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approach is unique to corporate law; indeed, transparency and independence 
have become buzzwords in international law as well. However, corporate 
law has honed specific mechanisms that add to the robustness of both 
strategies. Disclosure has allowed shareholders not only to monitor 
management more closely, but also to build coalitions with other 
shareholders and rally the votes necessary to effect change. Thus, disclosure 
may prove a more powerful weapon to a shareholder than, say, a seat on the 
board. In the IO context, greater disclosure can help mobilize members that 
would not have otherwise invested resources in IO reform, helping states 
collectively rein in or redirect a wayward IO. On the other hand, committees 
of independent board members are better placed to win the support of 
minority shareholders in a reform proposal, compared to management 
appointed by the majority shareholder. Independent members have their 
own reputations to consider, rely on separate advisors, and tend to do a 
thorough review of the question at hand. Thus, they offer higher guarantees 
of legitimacy. Especially when the proposal needs to win approval of the 
minority, the increased credibility of the committee carries significant 
weight. 
Our recommended approaches are not failsafe. Sometimes disclosure is 
misleading or “too little, too late.” Sometimes independent board members 
are handpicked to share management’s viewpoint. Still, both approaches 
provide shareholders with additional options, particularly when exiting 
through liquidation of stock is not viable. Time and again, courts have 
recognized that these mechanisms work to protect less powerful 
shareholders, and have agreed to limit their scrutiny accordingly. Before 
incurring the costs of abandoning an IO, states might find it worthwhile to 
explore whether governance modifications can change long-established 
dynamics. Similarly, before establishing an IO, states may find it useful to 
adopt an institutional design that can better manage conflict in the long run. 
Even when these options are not available, an enhanced understanding 
of the joint problem mitigates the extent to which the phenomenon is 
unintended, unexpected or misunderstood. Recognizing the existing myopia 
behind the joint problem allows states to better understand the fundamental 
compromise they are making when delegating powers to an IO. With this 
insight, they can face the consequences they deliberately put in place, aware 
of the trade-offs and long-run implications of their own making. 
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